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Traditionally, wildlife in America has been regarded as an inex-
haustible resource valued only for its economic utility to whoever suc-
ceeded in reducing it to possession. Even our more recent efforts to
manage the wildlife resource conscientiously have focused somewhat my-
opically on species' recreational value to hunters and fishermen, rather
than on their biological significance in their natural communities. This
treatment, combined with the destruction of habitat that has accompa-
nied economic development, has precipitated the decline and extinction
of numerous species.
Congress, recognizing this threat to a national resource of inestima-
ble economic and noneconomic value, enacted the Endangered Species
Act of 1973.1 The Act afforded imperilled species a panoply of protec-
tions, and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regula-
tions to further their conservation.
Over the years, the Fish and Wildlife Service, acting as the delegate
of the Interior Secretary, has faced the formidable task of resolving con-
flicts between the national interest in conserving threatened species and
the local economic interest in protecting property. The Service has re-
sponded to conflicts involving destruction of livestock by threatened gray
wolves and grizzly bears with regulations permitting regulated taking-
capturing and killing-of these protected species.
This Note considers the question of the Secretary's authority under
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to permit the regulated taking of
threatened species. Courts have heard several challenges to regulations
authorizing the destruction of threatened gray wolves, but similar regula-
tions pertaining to grizzly bears, though widely criticized, remain
unchallenged.
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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Courts ruling on the question have concluded that the Act and its
legislative history unambiguously describe the circumstances under
which the Secretary may authorize regulated taking. Accordingly, the
courts have overturned those aspects of the challenged regulations that
did not comport with their interpretations of the Act. Thus, the courts
have disposed of the issue as a pure question of law.
This Note analyzes the courts' reasoning in several regulated taking
cases and argues that, if the courts treat this issue as a pure question of
law, the Act and its history better support a more restrictive interpreta-
tion of the circumstances under which regulated taking is permissible.
Under this interpretation, regulated taking of threatened species would
be impermissible even when these animals cause property damage by
preying on livestock.
Under the modern standard of judicial review of informal adminis-
trative rulemaking, however, a reviewing court may not substitute its
own statutory construction for the agency's interpretation unless Con-
gress's intent regarding the matter in issue is expressed unambiguously
and with sufficient particularity. 2 This Note argues that under this defer-
ential standard, the Act's language and history might not express con-
gressional intent with sufficient clarity to allow substitution of either
statutory construction-the courts' or the author's-for the agency's
own.
This Note proposes that courts reviewing regulations permitting
taking of threatened species should not seek to determine whether certain
conservation methods are permissible as matters of law, but rather
should treat these decisions as normative judgments, requiring applica-
tion of the Act's legal norms to the circumstances of the particular depre-
dation problems each regulation is designed to address. Reviewing
courts should examine particular agency decisions to ensure that they are
based only on considerations that Congress would have sanctioned. 3 This
Note concludes that neither the challenged gray wolf regulations nor the
unchallenged grizzly bear regulations would be upheld under such "hard
look" judicial review.
4
Finally, the Note suggests additional measures that would help
agencies manage conflicts between threatened species and human eco-
nomic interests without resorting to regulated taking. The Endangered
Species Act of 1973 comprises the broadest spectrum of conservation
mechanisms in the history of federal wildlife conservation. This Note
proposes that wider employment of the full range of the Act's provisions
would make a significant contribution to the wildlife reclamation effort,
2. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 257-82 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 283-320 and accompanying text.
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and that certain fortifications and supplementations of the Act would
provide further solutions to resolve these conflicts.
I. Regulated Taking of Threatened Species
A. The Historic Decline of American Wildlife
Wildlife has long been abundant in the United States. Before the
continent was settled by Europeans, most of North America was inhab-
ited by people who subsisted solely by hunting animals and gathering
plants.5 Many early European settlers recounted with astonishment the
abundance of wildlife in the New World. 6 This natural bounty provided
settlers with the food and clothing they needed to survive, and thereby
played a key role in the early development of the nation.
Unfortunately, the burdens the human population has placed on
wildlife resources have resulted in the extinction of a number of species
and the decline of many more. Throughout history, humans have di-
rectly endangered wildlife by deliberately "taking," through capture or
killing, vast numbers of animals.
While some experts believe that this overexploitation began long
before the period of European settlement,7 all agree that the eighteenth
century witnessed an untoward decline in the wildlife resource. During
this period, subsistence hunting gave way to hunting for profit, called
"market hunting." Beavers were nearly eliminated by trappers capitaliz-
ing on American and European pelt markets.8 The decimation of Ameri-
can bison stopped only after the seemingly endless herds had been
reduced to approximately 500 bison.9 Sleeping ducks were slaughtered
by cannons.10 Passenger pigeons, possibly the most abundant bird spe-
cies ever to exist, had been hunted to extinction by 1914.11 Herons,
egrets, ibises, and other birds nearly succumbed to the onslaught of
hunters seeking their decorative feathers. Wild turkeys, whooping
cranes, moose, elk, whitetail deer, pronghorn antelopes, gray wolves, and
mountain lions were also nearly extirpated. 12 By the end of the nine-
teenth century, the wildlife resource of the United States was at its his-
5. Agriculture was also practiced in areas around present-day Mexico. R. DASMANN,
WILDLIFE BIOLOGY 20 (2d ed. 1981).
6. Steinhart, Abundance, AUDUBON, Jan. 1987, at 8, 10-11.
7. Prehistoric hunting during the Pleistocene Epoch may have played a significant role
in the extinction of such mammals as the woolly mammoth and saber-toothed cat. P. EHR-
LICH & A. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION 109-12 (1981).
8. R. BAKER, THE AMERICAN HUNTING MYTH 29-30 (1985).
9. At the zenith of the slaughter, an estimated 2.5 million bison were killed annually,
primarily for their tongues and hides. P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 116.
10. T. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 59 (1980).
11. P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 115.
12. R. BAKER, supra note 8, at 30-31; R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 167-68; T. LUND,
supra note 10, at 57-59.
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toric low point.
13
This pattern of unrestrained economic exploitation evinced a tradi-
tional belief that wildlife is an inexhaustible resource valued only for its
economic utility to the individual who succeeds in reducing it to posses-
sion. "The spirit of the nineteenth century considered the potential ex-
tinction of... species a small matter. If one single incident expresses in a
paradigm the public ethos of the period, it is that failed competition for
the glory of killing the last surviving American buffalo."
'14
B. Modern Threats to Wildlife Survival: Game Management, Depredator
Control, and Habitat Loss
During the late nineteenth century, many states established game
management programs to address the problem of dwindling wildlife
populations. Biologists conducted research to determine wildlife's physi-
cal requirements for adequate habitat.' 5 State legislatures chartered ad-
ministrative agencies to deal with game depletion. Game management
agencies devised hunting license requirements, bag limits, and hunting
seasons, and hired game wardens to enforce the new regulations. 16 In
1900, wildlife law took its first major step at the federal level when Con-
gress passed the Lacey Act, 17 legislation imposing federal sanctions on
the interstate transportation of wildlife taken in violation of state game
laws. 18
These efforts to manage wildlife represented a significant improve-
ment over the wholesale exploitation that had characterized market
hunting, but they have not proven to be a panacea for the problem of
wildlife decline. The purpose underlying game management programs is
to advance sport hunters' interests by preserving harvestable populations
of game species for recreational purposes. 19 The agencies that administer
these programs are fundamentally political; they operate on limited
budgets and are subject to substantial pressure from their most politically
active constituents: hunters and fishermen. 20 Furthermore, these agencies
receive most of their funding under a program that derives revenues from
federal taxes on hunting-related industries.
2'
13. Coggins & Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on The Federal Public Lands, 60
OR. L. REV. 59, 62 (1981).
14. T. LUND, supra note 10, at 60.
15. Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 66.
16. Id. at 62.
17. Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371-3378, 18 U.S.C. § 42
(1982)).
18. M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 17-18 (rev. ed. 1983).
19. R. BAKER, supra note 8, at 31-34.
20. Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 59, 73; see R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 182-83.
21. Under the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 669-669i (1982
& Supp. III 1985), revenues derived from federal excise taxes on the sale of firearms and
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Because state game management programs have their historical,
political, and economic roots in the sport hunting tradition, these pro-
grams strongly favor species that have recreational value for hunters.
22
This bias has resulted in management programs that operate to the detri-
ment of species traditionally viewed as inimical to game species popula-
tions.23 Predator species, denied the protection of state game laws,
remain vulnerable to overexploitation by sport and market hunters.
Game-oriented wildlife management is deleterious even to favored
wildlife populations because it neglects the "ecosystem": the complex of
subtly balanced interrelationships between species and habitat upon
which all species depend for survival.24 The disastrous result of the game
management experiment on Kaibab Plateau in Arizona is a classic exam-
ple of the folly of antipredator programs. In 1908, when managers initi-
ated their experiment, the mule deer population on this one million acre
arid canyon reserve numbered approximately 4,000. The experiment
prohibited hunting of mule deer and systematically eliminated the mule
deer's natural predators. "By 1924 over 6000 wolves, coyotes, and
mountain lions-and an uncounted number of golden eagles-had been
killed .... -25 Without natural predation pressure to maintain the bal-
ance between the deer population and the other natural resources of the
ammunition are remitted to the states in proportion to their geographical size and the number
of their residents who hold hunting licenses. M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 217-18. This pro-
gram had produced over $900 million for state management programs as of 1976. T. LUND,
supra note 10, at 85.
22. Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 73. "Because state agencies have been supported
directly and indirectly by fees and taxes paid by hunters and fishermen, they have often
adopted managerial and political stances in line with those of their major constituencies." Id.
(footnote omitted). See R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 182-83; Coggins & Ward, supra note
13, at 62, 66. "From the beginning of comprehensive wildlife regulation by states, the motiva-
tion has been ... to ensure food on the table of the hunter .... " Id. at 62. "[T]o many
wildlife managers, 'wildlife' traditionally meant only 'huntable, shootable, eatable, or mounta-
ble fish, shellfish, birds, and mammals.'" Id. at 68.
23. "Early wildlife managers reasoned... that carnivorous mammals ate deer and other
game that would otherwise be available to the hunter; therefore, human hunters would be
greatly assisted if all their bestial competitors were eliminated." Coggins & Ward, supra note
13, at 63. "Wildlife was either favored ... or disfavored .... Some state statutes retain such
distinctions by exempting from normal hunting regulation 'pests' (e.g., crows, starling, and
rodents) or 'predators' (e.g., coyotes, bobcats, and hawks)." Id. at 68 & n.43 (footnote omit-
ted) (discussing Dickens, The Law and Endangered Species of Wildlife, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 57
(1973)).
24. "An ecosystem, or ecological system, is a complex of living and nonliving environ-
mental components interacting and closely interdependent in any kind of fairly stable situa-
tion." R. LEDERER, ECOLOGY AND FIELD BIOLOGY 5 (1984). "The predatory species
evolved side-by-side with prey species; their mutual dependence is critical to the elusive stasis
called the balance of nature." Coggins & Evans, Predators'Rights and American Wildlife Law,
24 ARiz. L. REv. 821, 824 [hereinafter Coggins & Evans, Predators' Rights]. "[Antipredator
attitudes] retarded for decades scientific progress toward understanding ecological relation-
ships." Id. at 837.
25. Id.
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plateau, the deer population increased to approximately 100,000 and rap-
idly exhausted the food supply. During the winter of 1924, approxi-
mately 60,000 deer died of starvation. The herd continued to decline,
dwindling to about 10,000 deer by 1940, and the productivity of the area
has never recovered. 2
6
Many suggest that management philosophies are becoming more
conservation-oriented 27-a change reflected in the recent redesignation
of most state "game" agencies as "wildlife" agencies. Nevertheless, wild-
life biologists generally concede that management strategies still empha-
size maximizing harvests of game species at the risk of detriment to
nongame species.28 For this reason, and because wildlife biology is not
an "exact science,"' 29 management programs do not ensure the balance of
favored and disfavored species upon which the integrity of ecosystems
depends.
Not only have state game laws failed to protect predator species, but
federal and state agencies have made systematic efforts to eradicate these
species. Because they compete economically with man by feeding on fish,
game, livestock, or crops, "predator" species30 have historically been
26. Id. at 837-38; R. BAKER, supra note 8, at 71-72; Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at
63 n.15.
27. E.g., Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 64. "A turning point in [the] evolution [of
wildlife management] occurred during the 1930's .... [Firom the work of pioneers such as
Aldo Leopold, came the realization that 'habitat,' the land itself and the systems it supported,
was more important to wildlife production than all of the artificial manipulation projects." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
28. "The purpose of [management] manipulations is to produce 'harvestable surpluses' of
game species for the benefit of the hunters and fishermen who pay for the management pro-
grams." Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 66. The effect of such programs is not clear:
Hunting, by an outside species that does not form an integral part of an ecosystem,
removes the food supply of predators, parasites, scavengers, and all other organisms
that are in turn affected by these species. Continued removal of such a "surplus"
changes the ecosystem. How much, or in what direction, we have yet to find out.
R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 132-33. "Perhaps we can conclude that excessive management
of wildlife does not always bring the expected benefits. Certainly our knowledge of popula-
tions and ecosystems is still inadequate." Id. at 165.
29. Some commentators have characterized wildlife management as an "art" that devel-
oped by trial-and-error and suffered numerous failures, such as ecological imbalances caused
by introductions of nonnative species to supplement native game. Coggins & Ward, supra note
13, at 63-64.
30. In this Note, "predator" refers to (1) large carnivores, such as wolves, bears, moun-
tain lions, and alligators, (2) lesser carnivores, such as eagles, hawks, owls, coyotes, foxes.
bobcats, weasels, ferrets, and snakes, and (3) competitors not usually thought of as predators,
such as harbor seals (which eat salmon), wild horses and burros (which compete for forage),
sea otters (which eat abalone), and rabbits (which consume crops). See Coggins & Evans,
Predators' Rights, supra note 24, at 822-23. Biologically, any organism that kills and eats other
organisms is considered a "predator." R. LEDERER, supra note 24, at 408. For the purpose of
discussing predator control policies, however, this Note and most management programs ex-
clude from the class of predator species "pests," such as rats, mice, and roaches along with
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viewed as inimical to economic development. 3' Since the turn of the cen-
tury, individuals acting independently and under the auspices of govern-
ment bounty hunting and poisoning programs have vigorously pursued
the eradication of predator species. 32 These activities have resulted in
tremendous declines in predator populations, 33 and continue to threaten
both predator species and their ecosystems.
34
While hunting and predator control pose a direct and significant
threat, human population growth and economic development present a
much greater threat to wildlife species. Industrial and urban growth, ac-
companied by housing and factory advances into rural areas, highway
and airport construction, water diversion, and other large scale projects,
have deprived wildlife of essential habitat and contributed to the decline
and extinction of species. 35 Usage of forests, 36 ranges, 37 and farms38 de-
prive wildlife of essential habitat. Even habitat that is not consumed out-
many other organisms fitting the broader biological definition of "predator." See Coggins &
Evans, Predator Rights, supra note 24, at 823 (definition of pest).
31. "At the turn of the century, cattle and sheep raisers in the West estimated their live-
stock losses to predators at millions annually." Coggins & Evans, Predators'Rights, supra note
24, at 833. "Wildlife inflicts substantial injuries to agriculture. In addition to direct predation
upon livestock, indirect effects of wildlife, such as competition for forage, might severely di-
minish ranch productivity. Wildlife damage to farming, orchards, and timber also has impor-
tant economic consequences." T. LUND, supra note 10, at 39 (footnotes omitted). "Frontier
attitudes in this country often decreed that the only good predator was a dead one." Coggins
& Evans, Predators' Rights, supra note 24, at 824.
32. Coggins & Evans, Predators' Rights, supra note 24, at 827-30.
33. In the eastern United States, for example, "[w]olves were eliminated from New Eng-
land by 1788, and mountain lions disappeared from all but the most remote areas of the Ap-
palachians and the Everglades. Bears, eagles, foxes, and other predatory species declined
greatly and persisted only in straitened circumstances." Id. at 830 (footnote omitted).
34. In 1963, for example, federal predator control programs accounted for the destruc-
tion of at least 842 bears, 20,780 bobcats, 89,653 coyotes, 2771 red wolves, eight gray wolves,
and 294 mountain lions in the western United States. In addition, 76,415 "nontarget" victims
were recorded, including badger, beaver, fox, opossum, porcupine, raccoon, and skunk. Id. at
841. Many of these target and nontarget species, for example, gray and red wolf, grizzly bear,
and black-footed ferret, are today accorded special protected status as "endangered" or
"threatened" species. See Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 63. See infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the criteria for "endangered" and "threatened" species.
35. Sagoff, On the Preservation of Species, 7 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 33, 42-45 (1980).
36. "[T]he modern trend in forestry is toward high-yielding monocultures of fast-growing
tree varieties. To produce these high yields, all potential competitors are removed, and use of
herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, and rodenticides has been common. All are likely to have
directly damaging effects on wildlife." R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 188. See also Coggins &
Ward, supra note 13, at 133-35 (discussing the effect on wildlife of maximizing the yield of
timber).
37. "Overgrazing of ranges by livestock has in turn decreased their carrying capacity for
both wildlife and livestock." R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 187. Much of the land that re-
mains available for wildlife habitat is federally owned land in the public domain, administered
by the Bureau of Land Management of the United States Department of the Interior, and the
Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. Although both agencies are
charged with managing their lands for multiple use, including fish and wildlife conservation,
January 1988]
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right is often despoiled by air and water pollution.39
C. The Problem of Species Decline and Extinction
While the number of existing species of wildlife is unknown, 40 it is
undisputed that the rate of extinctions occurring in modern times has
increased tremendously. An incredible number of species are now at
risk.41 The decline and extinction of species have significant economic
consequences. Consumptive recreational uses like hunting and fishing,
and nonconsumptive uses such as bird watching and wildlife photogra-
phy, are multi-billion dollar industries in the United States.
42
Direct economic loss, however, constitutes only one of the concerns
over the rate of extinction of species. Many Americans find the loss of
species esthetically and ethically repugnant. 43 Some argue that wildlife
has as much of a "right" to exist as humans do, and criticize as morally
wrong the homocentric view that subordinates other species to our
own.44 Others suggest that, because we have our evolutionary roots in
prehistoric hunter-gatherer culture, our psychological health may well
depend upon continuing exposure to thriving ecosystems. 45 Aldo Leo-
pold, in his seminal statement on ecological awareness, wrote: "There are
some who can live without wild things and some who cannot. These es-
wildlife programs traditionally have received a minute percentage of the total budget alloca-
tion. Id. at 189-91.
38. Replacement of small scale, diversified agriculture with large scale, monocultural
agribusiness has further diminished the capacity of privately owned agricultural land to pro-
vide habitat for wildlife. Id. at 184-86.
39. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide caused acid rain has affected amphibian and fish
populations in the Northeast, and petroleum spills have affected coastal and marine birds and
other organisms. Polychlorinated biphenyls and pesticides also have threatened wildlife popu-
lations. The list of substances that are causing or have caused serious damage is long. Id. at
93.
40. P. EI-IRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 16-17.
41. A number of issues arise when one examines the possibility of extinction of various
species. One is the rate of extinction of species:
What concerns us today is not extinction in itself but the astonishing increase in the
rate of extinction and the knowledge that our technological society is largely respon-
sible for it. . . . More than half of the known extinctions over the last 2000 years
occurred during the last 60 years. Rates of extinction are likely to accelerate indefi-
nitely if trends in resource use and land management are not changed.
Sagoff, supra note 35, at 36-37 (footnotes omitted). "Since 1600, at least 300 species of animals
have become extinct due to human disturbance, and up to 4% of vertebrate species are now in
danger of becoming extinct." R. LEDERER, supra note 24, at 216. Another issue is the sheer
number of species that have become extinct: "The extinction rate is such today that it is no
longer unreasonable to think of a large fraction of the earth's biota becoming extinct before the
end of the century." R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 168.
42. R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 8-9.
43. P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 6.
44. Id. at 48-49.
45. Id. at 47-48.
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says are the delights and dilemmas of one who cannot."'46 Undoubtedly,
many of the millions of nature lovers in the United States would echo his
sentiments.4 7
Wildlife also has tremendous value in scientific research:
Sea urchins have helped develop an understanding of human embryol-
ogy; a desert toad has helped in the early determination of pregnancy;
rhesus monkeys have contributed toward an understanding of human
blood groups; the antlers of deer have provided a means for measuring
the degree of radioactive contamination of natural environments; stud-
ies of animal behavior have revealed new insights into the knots and
ravels encountered by psychiatrists in their studies of the human
mind. 4
8
Medical applications of chemicals derived from animals include anti-
cancer agents, antibiotics, antiviral agents, anticoagulants, contracep-
tives, and antivenoms. 49 Bioengineers have used animals and insects to
counteract the deleterious effects of chemicals and organisms, and to de-
velop new technologies.50 Even those species currently considered eco-
nomically useless may have some undiscovered value.51
The essential role that wildlife plays in the maintenance of a healthy
environment is undoubtedly its most important economic contribution.
Stable ecosystems depend upon the interdependencies of many species
performing different biological functions. When species are lost, ecosys-
tems are disrupted, and environmental instabilities follow that conceiva-
bly could result in a critical diminution of nature's "ability to provide a
moderate climate, cleanse air and water, recycle wastes, protect crops
from pests, replenish soils, and so on . . .52 The cataclysmic "Dust
Bowl" of the 1930s, which resulted from the displacement of natural eco-
systems in the Midwest to provide land for cereal grain production, is a
familiar example of these potentially disastrous consequences.
53
The specter of ecological catastrophe reveals the ultimate reason for
concern about species extinction. For an ecosystem to adapt biologically
to environmental changes such as a warming of climate or the appear-
ance of new parasites, it must have in its "gene pool" some genetic mate-
46. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC at vii (1965).
47. "There are some 8 million bird-watchers in the United States alone. A 1965 outdoor
recreation survey found that about 20 million Americans took nature walks and almost 3
million photographed wildlife annually." P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 46.
48. R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 10; see also P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7,
at 59-61 (discussion of medical benefits from animal spurs).
49. P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 58.
50. Id. at 70-71; R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 10.
51. Sagofi', supra note 35, at 52-53.
52. P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at xiii.
53. R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 41.
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rial with which to exploit the new conditions. 54 Species diversity ensures
the continuation of a robust gene pool. As humans replace diverse natu-
ral ecosystems with such "monocultures" as agricultural lands, the envi-
ronment becomes more vulnerable to changes. Recognizing that
biologists cannot predict the level of species diversity necessary to secure
against future changes in climate or environment, one commentator has
likened the loss of species to the loss of structural rivets on an airplane-
a dozen or so might never be missed, but the loss of the thirteenth might
spell disaster. 55
D. Congress's Response to the Problem: The Endangered Species
Act of 1973
In 1966, the United States Congress embarked on a course of con-
certed action to remedy the species decline and extinction problem.
56
Through the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1966, 57 Congress
augmented the authority of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to
acquire wildlife habitat lands for preservation. The Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 196958 directed the Secretary to promulgate a list of
54. See P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 98-100 (discussion of maladaptive
effects of limited gene pool).
55. Id. at xii-xiii.
56. The failure of game oriented state wildlife management programs to adequately ad-
vance the national interest in species preservation has prompted Congress to preempt tradi-
tional state authority in this area on several occasions. Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 60.
Several statutes authorize direct federal intervention in the regulation of taking. E.g., The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1982) (enacted 1918); The Bald Eagle Pro-
tection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1982) (enacted 1940); The Wild Free-Roaming Horses
and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982) (enacted 1971); The Airborne Hunting Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 742j-1 (1982) (enacted 1971); see M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 74-103.
In addition, numerous statutes provide for habitat acquisition and management. E.g., The
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715a-715d, 715e, 715f-715k, 715n-715r (1982)
(enacted 1929) (requiring state consent for acquisition); The National Wildlife Refuge System
Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (enacted 1966); The Multiple-
Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-530 (1982); The National Forest Manage-
ment Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (enacted 1976); The Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (enacted 1976);
see M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 40-44, 120-21, 136-45, 147-50, 155-60.
Other statutes require consideration of impacts on wildlife before federal projects are un-
dertaken. E.g., The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667d (1982) (en-
acted 1934); The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985); see M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 181-202. For discussions of the constitutional
basis for federal preemption of state wildlife management autonomy, see M. BEAN, supra note
18, at 12-28, and T. LUND, supra note 10, at 46-55.
57. Pub. L. No. 89-669, §§ 1-3, 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973), §§ 4-5, 80 Stat. 926,
redesignated as the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
91-135, § 12(f), 83 Stat. 275 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1982 & Supp. III
1985)).
58. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (§§ 1-6 repealed 1973) (remainder codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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species threatened with worldwide extinction, and to prohibit their im-
portation into the United States.
59
While the 1966 and 1969 Acts laid important foundations for the
federal protection effort, the resulting statutory scheme had several criti-
cal deficiencies. The statutes failed to adequately provide for the acquisi-
tion of habitat lands. Furthermore, only certain federal agencies were
included in the statutory scheme, and their conservation mandates were
made contingent upon considerations of practicability and compatibility
with their primary missions. Finally, the statutes failed to prohibit ex-
pressly the taking of imperilled domestic wildlife.60 By 1973, both Con-
gress and President Nixon had recognized that the existing law "simply
[did] not provide the kind of management tools needed to act early
enough to save a vanishing species."
' 61
Congress responded by enacting the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (Act),62 described by one commentator as,"the first federal statute
to embody a truly comprehensive federal effort at wildlife preserva-
tion."' 63 Congress declared that "species of fish, wildlife, and plants are
of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific
value ... ."64 Congress determined that untempered economic growth
and development had precipitated the extinction of various species of
American wildlife,65 and that "[t]he two major causes of extinction
[were] hunting and destruction of natural habitat. ' 66 These findings im-
pelled Congress to enact a more potent statutory scheme for conserving
imperilled species and their habitats. 67
The Act directs the Secretary to determine, on the basis of the best
scientific and commercial data available to him, 68 whether any species of
wildlife is "endangered" or "threatened." An endangered species is one
that is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range."'69 A threatened species is one that is "likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a sig-
59. Id. §§ 2, 3a.
60. M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 330.
61. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2989, 2991; President's Environmental Message of February 8, 1972, 8 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 218, 223-24 (Feb. 8, 1972).
62. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)).
63. M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 319.
64. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 2(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1982).
65. Id. § 2(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (1982).
66. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 61, at 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2990.
67. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 61, at 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2991-92; see Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1982).
68. Id. § 4(b)(1)(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(a) (1982).
69. Id. § 3(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1982).
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nificant portion of its range ' 70 because of habitat disruption, overex-
ploitation, natural causes, regulatory failures, or other factors. 71 The
Secretary determines the geographical areas essential to the conservation
of listed species and designates as "critical habitat" those areas that re-
quire special management. Once so designated, these areas are protected
from adverse modification through any federal action.72 Interested per-
sons may petition the Secretary to make or modify any designation of
species or habitat under the Act.73 Lists of threatened and endangered
species and critical habitats are subject to notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing procedures, and proposed and final lists are published in the Federal
Register.
74
The Act provides the Secretary with greater land acquisition author-
ity than did the earlier versions of the legislation.7 5 Furthermore, the Act
requires that, unless they are granted specific exemptions, all federal
agencies insure that their actions are not likely either to jeopardize the
continued existence of any listed species or to adversely modify any criti-
cal habitat.
76
The particular protections that apply to listed species vary in ac-
cordance with the species' status under the Act. All manner of com-
merce involving endangered species is expressly prohibited,7 7 as is the
"taking" of endangered species.7 8 "Taking" is broadly defined to include
not only hunting, shooting, trapping, capturing, or collecting, but any
form of harassment, harm, pursuit, or wounding,7 9 and has been judi-
cially construed to prohibit oblique forms of indirect harm such as failure
to prevent adverse habitat modification.8 0 The taking prohibition applies
to any "person," which is defined to include instrumentalities of federal
and state government as well as private entities.8 1 The Act also imposes
substantial civil and criminal penalties on violators.
8 2
The Secretary may only issue permits allowing the taking of endan-
gered species under certain circumstances. The statute authorizes taking
"for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the
70. Id. § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1982).
71. Id. § 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1982).
72. Id. § 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1982).
73. Id. § 4(b)(3)(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (1982).
74. Id. § 4(b)-(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)-(c) (1982).
75. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 5(a)-(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)-(b) (1982); M.
BEAN, supra note 18, at 319.
76. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7(a)-(p), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(p) (1982).
77. Id. § 9(a)(1)(A), (D)-(F), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A), (D)-(F) (1982).
78. Id. § 9(a)(1)(B)-(C), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C) (1982).
79. Id. § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1982).
80. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 497-98 (9th Cir.
1981).
81. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 3(13), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1982).
82. Id. § ll(a)-(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)-(b) (1982).
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affected species,"'8 3 or if the takings are "incidental to, and not the pur-
pose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity" 84 and "the tak-
ing will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and
recovery of the species in the wild."'85 The Secretary may grant exemp-
tions when restrictions would constitute an "undue economic hard-
ship,"' 86 as in the case of individuals dependent upon reasonably
necessary subsistence hunting.87 The Act also makes special provision
for liberalized taking of members of "experimental populations" intro-
duced outside their current range for the purpose of improving their
prospects for survival as a species.
88
Threatened species may not necessarily receive the same protection
under the Act as do endangered species. Instead, the Act gives the Secre-
tary discretion to extend any of section 9(a)(1)'s provisions to threatened
species.8 9
The Act further directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations for
the conservation of threatened and endangered species. The Secretary
must create "recovery teams" of qualified persons to develop recovery
plans for conserving threatened and endangered species. 90 The Secretary
is to "issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to pro-
vide for the conservation of [threatened] species," 91 and these regulations
are binding on all "persons" within the meaning of the Act.92 "Conser-
vation" is defined as
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.
Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activi-
ties associated with scientific resources management such as research,
census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propa-
gation, live trapping, and transplantation, and, in the extraordinary
case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.
93
Recognizing that "the states are far better equipped to handle the
problems of day-to-day management and enforcement of [conservation]
laws and regulations,"' 94 Congress authorized the Secretary to enter into
83. Id. § 10(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (1982).
84. Id. § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1982).
85. Id. § 10(a)(2)(B)(iv), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1982).
86. Id. § 10(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b) (1982).
87. Id. § 10(b)(2)(C), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b)(2)(C) (1982).
88. Id. § 10(j), 16 U.S.C. § 15390) (1982).
89. Id. § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982).
90. Id. § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1982).
91. Id. § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982).
92. Id. § 9(a)(1)(G), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(G) (1982).
93. Id. § 3(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
94. H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT OF 1973, As AMENDED IN 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979,
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''cooperative agreements" with states that maintain adequate programs
for conserving listed species.95 To encourage states to enter into these
agreements, the federal government may subsidize seventy-five percent of
an individual state's conservation program costs.
96
E. United States Fish and Wildlife Service Regulations Authorizing
Regulated Taking of Threatened Species
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Service), under author-
ity delegated to it by the Secretary, is responsible for promulgating con-
servation regulations for threatened species. On several occasions in the
years since the passage of the Act, the Service, in pursuit of its conserva-
tion mandate, has faced the formidable task of resolving conflicts be-
tween the federal interest in conserving threatened predators and local
economic interests in protecting property. For a number of reasons, the
Service has responded by issuing regulations authorizing controlled tak-
ing of threatened species. Some of these regulations have been chal-
lenged in the courts as putative violations of the Act. Others have not
been formally challenged, but have been strongly criticized by wildlife
advocates.
(1) Gray Wolf Regulations
The threatened gray wolf (canis lupus) has been the subject of some
of the most controversial regulations. The gray wolf, a species that for-
merly thrived throughout North America, has been eliminated through
extermination and habitat destruction from all of its former range in the
United States except Alaska and the northern Great Lakes region. 97 Di-
rect killing by sport and commercial hunters and trappers has been the
primary cause of the wolf's decline. 98 The Secretary listed the gray wolf
as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Conservation
Act of 1966, and that classification was automatically readopted under
the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 99
In 1978, the Service classified the gray wolf population in northern
Minnesota as a separate "species" within the meaning of the Act, and
AND 1980, at 146 (1982) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. One commentator has noted,
"[T]he 180 or so [U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service] enforcement agents cannot possibly police the
entire Nation for violations of the Act. The states and territories, on the other hand, have over
5,000 enforcement personnel .... " Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 115.
95. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 6(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1) (1982).
96. Id. § 6(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d)(2) (1982).
97. While a few scattered individuals are believed to exist in northern Michigan, Wiscon-
sin, Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho, the only substantial population remaining outside Alaska
and Canada is in northern Minnesota. 43 Fed. Reg. 9607, 9607-08 (1978).
98. Id. at 9611.




downlisted the species from endangered to threatened status. 1' ° The
gray wolf population was not so stable in the region however, that it no
longer required protection. In fact, the Service's expert recovery team
had noted in its Recovery Plan that "[f]uture circumstances are unpre-
dictable and those that now exist could change drastically. For example,
widespread industrialization, mineral exploitation, and general develop-
ment could threaten much of the wolf's remaining range, making regula-
tion increasingly significant to the populations left."101 The Service
acknowledged that "the Minnesota population does represent the last
significant element of a species that once occupied a vastly larger range in
the lower 48 States, and long-term trends may be working against the
wolf."10 2 The Service found, however, that the wolf's "[n]umbers have
fluctuated, but seem to have increased in some areas, and there has been
an overall increase in range," and that "the species was not in immediate
danger of being extirpated in the State."
10 3
The Service also determined that ecological changes had affected the
Minnesota wolf population and created new management problems. The
population of deer, the wolf's main prey species, had declined in the
wolf's remote primary range, mainly because of forest maturation and
severe winter weather. ' 4 As conditions declined, wolves dispersed into
the "peripheral range"-areas from which they had previously been
driven by extensive human settlement-and occasionally preyed upon
domestic animals.
10 5
The presence and activities of wolves in the peripheral range caused
concern among local residents. As a result, many wolves encountered in
these areas were killed illegally, even though the species remained feder-
ally protected.10 6 In response to political pressure from their constituen-
cies, the State Legislature of Minnesota passed, and the Governor
approved, a resolution calling for complete declassification of the wolf in
Minnesota and return of management authority to the state Department
of Natural Resources.
0 7
The Service concluded that the legal protection afforded wolves
by their endangered classification under the Act had become
counterproductive:
In Minnesota, wolves are totally protected under the Act, but this total
protection may actually be working against the species. By prohibiting
the killing of wolves, even those that may be attacking livestock and
100. 43 Fed. Reg. 9607, 9612 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1986)).
101. Id. at 9611.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 9608, 9610-11.
104. Id. at 9611.
105. Id. at 9608, 9611.
106. Id. at 9611.
107. Id. at 9608.
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pets, current regulations may be creating an adverse public attitude
toward the whole species.' 0 8
By downlisting the wolf, the Service sought not only to accurately
reflect the wolf's biological status, but also to enable the Service to pro-
mulgate regulations that the Service believed would further the conserva-
tion of the species. The Service issued a regulation that authorized
federal and state wildlife managers to "take a gray wolf without a permit
in Minnesota if such action is necessary to remove [from the peripheral
range] a gray wolf committing significant depredations on lawfully pres-
ent domestic animals, but only if the taking is done in a humane
manner."109
According to the Service, the depredator control regulation was the
most practical means of dealing with the problem, would not be detri-
mental to the overall wolf population, and would generally benefit the
species. 10 The Service conceded that "[t]he population in [the periph-
eral range] might be held below biological potential," but argued that the
regulation "will reduce conflicts with human interests and should create
a more favorable public attitude that would be of overall benefit to the
wolf.""1
The proposed rule generated numerous criticisms during the notice-
and-comment period. The Service rejected an argument that the taking
of depredatory individuals might damage the social structure of affected
wolf packs, finding the theory to be unsupported by evidence." 2 Numer-
ous politicians and environmental groups accused the Service of capitu-
lating to local political pressure by reclassifying the wolf, but the Service
insisted that it had based the reclassification solely on an evaluation of
the best available biological data, as required under the Act." 
3
Several environmental groups suggested nonlethal management al-
ternatives. The Service agreed to consider these alternatives, but rejected
them as solutions to the immediate problem. One of the alternatives sug-
gested was translocation, which would involve live capture and transfer
of wolves to remote areas. Although management programs had used
translocation exclusively between 1974 and 1977, the Service determined
that wolves that were relocated to the declining habitat within their pri-
mary range frequently dispersed again, and some returned to the various
areas from which they had been removed. The Service considered the
program to be an unsatisfactory solution to the problem," 4 and indicated
that while translocation would remain a "viable option," the Service
108. Id.
109. Id. at 9615.
110. Id. at 9607, 9611.
111. Id. at 9611.
112. Id. at 9610.
113. Id. at 9607, 9609.
114. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,530 (1982).
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likely would use capture by conventional steel leghold traps and subse-
quent destruction.' 1
5
Between 1975 and 1978, seventeen confirmed instances of depreda-
tion occurred in northern Minnesota. During that period, 151 wolves,
including at least twenty-seven pups, were captured and relocated under
the Service's translocation program. This program did not discriminate
between actual depredators and nondepredatory wolves living within the
vicinity of farms where depredation had occurred.' 16 After reclassifying
the wolf in 1978, the Service declared its intent to "continue this policy
of prophylactic or preventative elimination of wolves," allowing trap set-
ting as far as five miles from affected farms, and destroying the trapped
adults and pups whenever the Service determined that translocation
would be ineffective.
117
a. Depredator Control: Fund For Animals v. Andrus
In 1978, several environmental groups brought suit in federal dis-
trict court seeking to enjoin the Service from continuing the depredator
control program it had authorized under the new regulation. In Fund
For Animals v. Andrus, 118 the district court struck down the program as
an arbitrary action based on an impermissible interpretation by the Ser-
vice of its own 1978 regulation 1 9 regarding depredator control. 120 Since
the court's ruling turned on the Services's unjustified departure from its
own regulation, it was not necessary for the court to reach the question
of the statutory limits on the Secretary's discretion to authorize taking of
threatened species. 121 Nevertheless, the court discussed this question in
dicta.
The court determined that the Act imposes a duty on the Secretary
''not merely to refrain from negative action but to engage in affirmative
115. 43 Fed. Reg. 9610 (1978).
116. Fund For Animals v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189, 2191 (D. Minn.
1978). The court also noted that "[o]bviously it did not take 151 wolves to kill 17 cows, so one
must conclude that some of these wolves, at least the pups, were not actively engaged in live-
stock depredation." Id. at 2198.
117. Id. at 2191; 43 Fed. Reg. 9610 (1978).
118. 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (D. Minn. 1978).
119. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.40, 17.95 (1986).
120. Fund For Animals, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2197-98.
121. The court stated:
If one assumes that there is authority under the Endangered Species Act for a pro-
gram embodying the essence of the course of action upon which the Director has
now embarked, one is forced to conclude that he is now doing precisely what he has
previously represented that he could not do under the regulation which he
promulgated.
Id. at 2197.
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action to increase the population of the threatened species."' 122 It further
stated that programs to manage conflicts between wolves and farmers
must strive to "enhance and protect the vestige of the wolf population
and still effectively protect human interests where possible."' 1 23 The trap-
ping program, the court found, threatened to violently disrupt the social
order within the wolf pack and disturb the wolf's reproductive pat-
terns. 124 Furthermore, the consensus of the experts was that such trap-
ping would not ultimately prevent depredation. In fact, the court found,
"the government's program may eventually solve the predator wolf prob-
lem, but only at the cost of annihilating the wolves."' 125 The court indi-
cated that more experimentation was necessary to find superior solutions
to the problem, and that some loss of livestock to wolves "appear[ed] to
be unavoidable." 1
26
Although the court found prophylactic trapping to be impermissi-
ble, it stated that the Service may capture wolves that it reasonably be-
lieved to have actually committed depredations. To avoid trapping
nonoffending wolves, the court reasoned, the Service should restrict
trapping to within one quarter mile of the affected property's border. 1
27
Furthermore, the Service may legally destroy a wolf captured in such a
fashion when the following conditions are met: the captured individual is
mature enough to have been physically capable of committing depreda-
tion, 128 the individual is taken in a peripheral area where the wolf popu-
lation density exceeds the "optimum" level recommended by the expert
recovery team to minimize conflicts with human inhabitants,' 29 and no
biologically advisable or practically feasible translocation alternative is
currently available.
130
The Fund For Animals court determined that such taking of
threatened species would be permissible under the Act as long as the
specified conditions were met. The court reasoned that "[t]he mandate
of the Endangered Species Act does not include the impossible,"' 13 ' and
that the Secretary's authority under section 4(d) of the Act to issue regu-
lations he deems necessary and advisable for the conservation of
threatened species "must, logically, include the power to provide for lim-
122. Id. at 2199 (citing with approval Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 429 F. Supp. 167
(D.D.C. 1978)).
123. Id. at 2198.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2202-03.
126. Id. at 2198.
127. Id. at 2200, 2203.
128. Id. at 2202.
129. Id. at 2199. The court noted that the recovery team recommended limiting the wolf
population to one wolf per fifty square miles in the peripheral range, in order to reduce wolf-
human confrontations causing "vilification" of the species and illegal killings. Id. at 2193.
130. Id. at 2198-99.
131. Id.
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ited taking under specific conditions." 132 Specifically, where wolf popu-
lation levels exceed the recovery team's recommendations, the Service
could classify depredators as "excess" wolves. Since section 3(2) of the
Act authorizes taking as a conservation measure "in the extraordinary
case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved,"' 133 the court determined that such taking would be
"clearly permissible." 134
For several years following the Fund For Animals decision, the Ser-
vice restricted gray wolf depredator control activities in accordance with
the guidelines established by the district court. The Service conducted
trapping only within one quarter mile from the boundaries of affected
farms 135 and released immature wolves upon capture. 136 In addition, the
Service experimented with various nonlethal techniques aimed at
preventing depredation.137 The State of Minnesota maintained a program
that provided compensation to farmers who suffered losses from
depredation.
138
The Service described its program as "basically sound and effec-
tive," indicating that "when the numbers of cattle or sheep available to
wolves in Minnesota is considered, depredation has not been a wide-
spread problem."' 139 Furthermore, although the data concerning the
merits of nonlethal alternatives were incomplete, the Service conceded
that preliminary results suggested that such techniques "can be effective
under certain circumstances. ' 14°
Nevertheless, according to the Service, there remained "some areas
of the State where depredation problems have not been solved by the
Service's prior control program."' 41 The Service acknowledged that dep-
redation is a complex phenomenon that is only partly understood. It is
uncommon enough in the species as a whole to be considered aberrant
behavior. Mere proximity to livestock is not enough to cause depreda-
132. Id. at 2199.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982).
134. Fund For Animals, I1 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2199.
135. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,530 (1982).
136. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,258 (1983).
137. These alternatives included several types of "taste aversion" techniques, such as lac-
ing livestock carrion with foul tasting, nauseating chemicals designed to modify the potentially
depredatory behavior of adults and pups. The Service also used flashing lights and trained
herd guarding dogs to frighten wolves away from livestock. Id. at 36,263.
138. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,530 (1982).
139. Id. at 30,530. The Service noted that losses tended to be concentrated, with a few
farmers sustaining the great majority of the losses. In fact, two farmers received nearly 50% of
the total state compensation payments for depredation loss. Id.; 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,259
(1983).
140. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,263 (1983).
141. Id. at 36,261. For example, the state paid $22,000 to farmers sustaining depredation
losses during 1981. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,532 (1982).
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tion, since pack boundaries often adjoin pastures without occurrence of
depredation. When depredation does occur, elimination of the actual
culprit is usually sufficient to resolve the problem unless other causative
factors are present, such as poor animal husbandry practices by farm-
ers. 142 The Service indicated that enforcement of livestock sanitation
laws is essential to managing depredation,1 43 and agreed with the recov-
ery team that providing adequate natural prey by managing habitat
within the wolves' primary range is important. 144
In 1982, the Service, unwilling to accept the vestige of depredation
that resisted their continuing control efforts, proposed more aggressive
regulations. The Service believed that it was inappropriate to rely on the
state compensation program to make whole those few farmers who con-
tinued to lose livestock to depredatory wolves. The Service argued that
such reliance on the state program constituted "acquiescence" by wildlife
management authorities, and would "breed both contempt for govern-
ment and . . .illegal taking .... ,,145
The Service's 1982 proposal advocated liberalized depredator con-
trol and regulated sport hunting and trapping to solve the depredation
problem. The Service maintained that wolf pups indirectly contribute to
the depredation problem by increasing the pack's need for food and by
emulating depredatory adults later in life.146 Release of captured
juveniles by government trappers, the Service argued, angers farmers and
contributes to the vilification of wolves, ultimately resulting in illegal kill-
ings. 14 7 To alleviate these problems, the Service proposed to modify that
regulation to allow taking of immature wolves. 148 Since the Service inter-
preted the Fund For Animals decision as imposing restrictions only on
activities conducted pursuant to the regulation in effect at the time of
that litigation, the decision would have no effect on the new regulation.
The Service also maintained that the one quarter mile distance limitation
imposed by the district court was "too confining," and that increasing
142. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,259 (1983). Permitting livestock to calve in the woods or
disposing of livestock carcasses in or near pastures has been shown to cause depredation. See
Goldman-Carter, Federal Conservation of Threatened Species: By Administrative Discretion or
by Legislative Standard?. 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1983) (citing S. FRITT,
WOLF DEPREDATION ON LIVESTOCK IN MINNESOTA (United States Fish & Wildlife Service
Resource Pub. No. 145 (1982)).
143. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,264 (1983).
144. Id. at 36,257. Cessation of timbering in the primary range pursuant to reclassification
of forest lands as "wilderness" under the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), caused a reduction of browse available to deer. Deer populations decreased,
and wolves dispersed into peripheral areas. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,258 (1983).
145. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,261 (1983).
146. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,530 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg 36,256, 36,258 (1983).
147. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,258 (1983).
148. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,530 (1982).
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the trapping radius would ameliorate the depredation problem. 149 To
address these putative deficiencies, the Service proposed to modify the
regulation to permit killing any wolf caught within one half mile of an
affected property boundary.150
The Service also proposed to allow regulated public taking of wolves
in the peripheral range by sport hunters and trappers.1 51 The Service
hoped to accomplish several goals by allowing public taking. First, the
Service intended to reduce the wolf population density in the peripheral
range to one wolf per fifty square miles-the "optimum" level recom-
mended by the recovery team in order to minimize confrontations be-
tween wolves and humans.1 52 Second, the Service hoped to secure the
cooperation of the Minnesota game authorities in enforcing the taking
restrictions. Minnesota had "indicated that it [would] not devote sub-
stantial resources to a wolf management plan, unless the plan contained
the flexibility to permit a carefully controlled taking of wolves by the
public."1 53 Third, the Service hoped to reduce the vilification of wolves
that it found to lead to illegal killings. Additionally, the Service stated
that there was "some indication" that protection from taking had caused
wolves in Minnesota to lose some of their fear of humans. 154 Although
"the likelihood of an actual wolf attack on a human being is extremely
unlikely," the Service reasoned, the animal's boldness stimulates people's
fear of the wolf, in turn leading to an increase in illegal killings.1 5
5
The Service received numerous critical comments during the notice-
and-comment period for the proposed regulation. Many called for utili-
zation of nonlethal alternatives to depredator control and public taking.
The Service rejected these as alternatives to the proposed regulation for a
variety of reasons. For example, the Service rejected taste aversion tech-
niques as an alternative, although it found they had some beneficial ef-
fect, because "the extent [did] not appear to be conclusive."'' 56 The
Service also rejected suggestions to fence pastures because of prohibitive
costs and questionable efficacy.' 57 While the Service found guarding
dogs and other alternatives admittedly beneficial, it rejected them be-
cause their ability to completely eliminate the problem had not been
proven. 158 The Service dismissed prospects for improved enforcement of
livestock sanitation laws, asserting that the amount of depredation attrib-
149. Id. at 30,530-31.
150. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,258 (1983).
151. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,531 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,259 (1983).
152. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,531-32 (1982).
153. Id. at 30,531.
154. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,259 (1983).
155. Id. at 36,260.
156. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,530 (1982).
157. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256, 36,263 (1983).
158. Id.
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utable to poor practices was "relatively small."'' 59 Finally, responding to
the suggestion that deer hunting should be curtailed to increase the
wolf's natural prey supply, the Service noted that Minnesota was vigor-
ously pursuing efforts to improve the deer population.
160
The Service decided to encourage wolf recolonization only in "ap-
propriate habitat," and proposed to allow liberalized depredator control
and regulated public taking in peripheral areas as long as population did
not fall below the "optimum" levels recommended by the recovery
team. 161 These regulations were promulgated in final form in 1983.162
b. Public Hunting: Sierra Club v. Clark
In 1984, several environmental groups brought suit in federal dis-
trict court seeking to enjoin the Service from proceeding with the liberal-
ized depredator control and regulated public taking programs in
Minnesota. The district court, in Sierra Club v. Clark, struck down the
public taking regulation on the ground that it was inconsistent with the
Act's mandate to increase the population of affected species, 6 3 and fur-
ther held that no takings of threatened species were permissible under the
Act absent a finding of extraordinary population pressures within the
ecosystem. '
64
The Sierra Club v. Clark court also struck down the liberalized dep-
redator control regulation, but did so without reaching the question of
whether such programs were permissible under the Act. The court de-
termined that no explanation had been supplied by the Service for their
change in policy, and held that regulations changed without explanation
are assumed to be changed for a reason that is impermissible under the
Act. '
65
On appeal, the Interior Secretary argued for a construction of the
Act providing him with broad discretion to utilize regulated taking as a
conservation measure for threatened species. 166 The Secretary noted that
unlike section 9(a) of the Act, which expressly prohibits taking of endan-
gered species, section 4(d) authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations
that "he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation"
of threatened species. Furthermore, he argued, while section 4(d) ex-
pressly permits him to extend to threatened species the protections af-
forded endangered species under section 9(a), he is not expressly required
159. Id. at 36,264.
160. Id.
161. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,531 (1982).
162. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256 (1983) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 17.40 (1986)).
163. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp 783, 789 (D. Minn. 1984).
164. Id. at 788.
165. Id. at 790.
166. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1985).
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to do So. 167 Thus, the Secretary concluded, where, as here, regulated
taking would serve a conservation purpose by addressing the problems
contributing to a species' decline, such takings are within the scope of the
Secretary's discretion under the Act.
168
The Secretary further argued that the legislative history of the Act
evinced a congressional purpose to authorize his use of regulated taking
as a conservation measure. 169 The Secretary also noted that the legisla-
tive history of section 10(j), added by amendment to the Act in 1982 to
provide authority for recolonizing suitable habitats with experimental
populations of listed species, expressly authorized regulated taking of ex-
perimental populations.
70
The Eighth Circuit rejected the Secretary's arguments and affirmed
the district court's ruling regarding the sport trapping program, but re-
versed and remanded on the question of the legality of the amendments
to the depredator control regulation. 17' Regarding the sport trapping
regulation, the court held that the ordinary meaning of the plain lan-
guage of the Act clearly circumscribes the Secretary's discretion to au-
thorize takings of threatened species. 172 The Secretary's mandate to
"conserve" under section 4(d), the court held, must be construed in light
of the definition of conservation in section 3(2) of the Act. Under section
3(2), conservation includes, but is not limited to, scientific resource man-
agement, which in turn may include regulated taking, but only "in the
extraordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem
cannot be otherwise relieved."' 73 The court affirmed the lower court's
ruling that public hunting of threatened species without a finding of ex-
traordinary population pressures is prohibited by the Act, 174 and that
regulations permitting takings without such a finding fall "without the
scope of authority granted to the Secretary."'
75
The Sierra Club v. Clark court held that debating the merits of regu-
lated taking as a conservation measure was irrelevant because the statu-
tory language was unambiguous on the matter. 76 Although the court
determined that it was unnecessary to inquire further than the face of the
statute, the court examined the Act's legislative history to ensure consis-
tency with the congressional purpose. 177 The court gave priority to the
167. Id. at 612.
168. Id. at 614.
169. Id. at 615-16 (citing H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), and S. 1983,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4(e), 3(1) (1973)).
170. Id. at 617-18.
171. Id. at 608.
172. Id. at 615.
173. Id. at 613.
174. Id. at 610.
175. Id. at 613.
176. Id. at 618.
177. Id. at 615 & n.9.
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conference report accompanying the Act, finding that it represented the
final statement of terms agreed to by both houses and, as such, was the
most dependable source of information regarding congressional intent
aside from the statute itself.178 The court found that the report clearly
indicated that only "[i]n extreme circumstances, as where a given species
exceeds the carrying capacity of its particular ecosystem and where this
pressure can be relieved in no other feasible way, . . . 'conservation'
might include authority for carefully controlled taking of surplus mem-
bers of the species."' 179 The court emphasized that this statement repre-
sented a deliberate rejection of the provision in the Senate bill that would
have granted the Secretary discretion to authorize a sport season as a
means of conserving threatened species.' 80 While the legislative history
of section 10() revealed an intent to grant broader discretion to allow
regulated taking, the court determined that this discretion extended only
to the taking of members of experimental populations.' 8'
Regarding the proposed changes to the depredator control program,
the court held that, while section 10(a)(1)(A) does not permit sport hunt-
ing, it does permit the taking of depredating animals "for scientific pur-
poses or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected
species."'' 8 2 The court reversed the lower court's ruling that the Secre-
tary had not provided an explanation for the proposed changes in the
depredator control regulations, and remanded for a determination
whether the amendments were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of the dis-
cretion conferred by the Endangered Species Act, 183 or promulgated
without procedural compliance with section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 1
84
On remand, the lower court ordered the Secretary to amend the
depredator control regulations to require reasonable belief that the cap-
tured individual had actually committed depredation. The court left un-
disturbed, however, the provision allowing trapping within one half mile
of an affected property boundary.
8 5
As a result of this litigation, the regulations affecting threatened
gray wolves in Minnesota today' 86 are essentially the same as those ini-
tially promulgated shortly after the wolf was downlisted from endan-
gered to threatened status in 1978. Public hunting is prohibited, but
178. Id. at 615.
179. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973)).
180. Id. at 617.
181. Id. at 617-18 (citing S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982)).
182. Id. at 614.
183. Id. at 619. For a discussion of the "arbitrary, capricious" standard, see infra notes
275-78 and accompanying text.
184. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
185. Sierra Club v. Clark, 607 F. Supp. 737, 738 (D. Minn. 1985).
186. 50 Fed. Reg. 50,792 (1985) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 17.40 (1986)).
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wolves may be trapped within one half mile of property affected by "sig-
nificant depredation" and, if the trapped individual is reasonably believed
to have committed the depredation and translocation is impracticable,
the wolf may be destroyed.
(2) Grizzly Bear Regulations
The grizzly bear (ursus arctos horribilis) once ranged throughout the
western portion of the coterminous forty-eight States. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the grizzly had been eliminated from all but isolated
regions of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming.
187
In 1975, in response to a citizen petition, the Service listed the griz-
zly bear as a threatened species throughout the coterminous forty-eight
States. 188 The Service found that depredation and other forms of bear-
human conflict including, on rare occasions, bear attacks on humans,
were causing "a continual loss of animals through indiscriminate illegal
killing." 18 9 The Service promulgated regulations authorizing the taking
of grizzlies by state and federal wildlife managers "to remove demonstra-
ble but non-immediate threats to human safety, or to prevent significant
depredations on livestock lawfully on the premises . . . and only after
reasonable efforts to live-capture and release unharmed in a remote area
the bear involved have failed." 190
The regulations also authorized regulated public hunting of grizzlies
within the Bob Marshall ecosystem in the State of Montana. 191 The Ser-
vice explained that it wished to reduce bear populations within this
habitat to minimize bear-human confrontations and depredations on live-
stock. 1 92 The Service deemed hunting to be preferable to post facto tak-
ing of actual depredators because, while "the occasional taking of one
bear does not create a fear of man among the grizzly bear population in
general, . . . a regulated sport hunt will create an adequate fear of
man."' 193 Additionally, the Service found hunting to be preferable to live
translocation because such "transplanting is simply too dangerous and
too expensive to be used with sufficient frequency .... 1-194
187. Specifically, the Selway-Bitterroot ecosystem in Idaho, the Bob Marshall ecosystem,
including Glacier National Park in Montana, and the Yellowstone ecosystem, including Yel-
lowstone National Park in Wyoming. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,734 (1975).
188. Id. (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1986)). The Service determined that
while the grizzly is not in immediate danger of extinction within its remaining range, pressures
from legal and illegal taking "could render this species endangered within the foreseeable fu-
ture throughout its range." Id.
189. Ird.
190. Id. at 31,735 (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 17.40 (1986)) (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 31,735-36.
192. Id. at 31,735.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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The Service acknowledged that it lacked important information con-
cerning the biological condition of the remaining grizzly bear popula-
tions. 195 Nevertheless, it declared that where a sufficient density of bears
exists to cause conflicts with human activities in the peripheral range,
such density constituted "population pressure" within the meaning of
section 3(2) of the Act. 196 The Service justified the public hunting provi-
sions as regulated taking authorized under section 3(2) "in the extraordi-
nary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved."'
' 97
The grizzly bear regulations have had some adverse effects on re-
maining grizzly populations. In 1985, the Service acknowledged that
populations in the hunted areas of the Bob Marshall ecosystem had de-
clined, and that it needed to revise those regulations. 98 At the same
time, however, the Service argued that population increases in
nonhunted sections of the peripheral range were leading to increased
bear-human conflicts. 199 For these reasons, the Service amended the reg-
ulations by both curtailing public taking in previously hunted areas and
authorizing regulated taking in areas where the bears were previously
protected.2
00
Federal grizzly bear management efforts are also having deleterious
effects on remaining populations in locations other than the Bob Mar-
shall ecosystem. In 1985, the head of the expert team organized to de-
velop recovery plans mandated by the Act reported that extinction of the
grizzly bear in the Yellowstone ecosystem is now a possibility: "There
are ... various grounds to believe that the population may be declining,
and good evidence that the number of adult breeding females is small.
The prospect of extirpation thus has to be considered. ' 20 1 Even federal
wildlife managers acknowledge that a major cause of mortality among
Yellowstone grizzlies is regulated taking associated with depredator
control. 20
2
The regulations authorizing takings of threatened grizzly bears have
not yet been challenged in the courts, but they present many of the same
195. "Specifically lacking are better data on habitat condition and carrying capacity, total
numbers, annual reproduction and mortality, and most importantly, annual turnover and pop-
ulation trends." Id. at 31,734.
196. Id. at 31,735.
197. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(2) (1973) (now codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(3) (1982))).
198. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,086, 35,087 (1985).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 35,088-89 (1985) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 17.40 (1986)).
201. Chase, The Grizzly and the Juggernaut, OUTSIDE, Jan. 1986, at 29, 30 (quoting
Knight & Eberhardt, Population Dynamics of the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear, 66 ECOLOGY 323
(1985)). See generally A. CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE 142-94 (1986).
202. "Controlled action" accounted for 13 of 41 known human-caused grizzly mortalities
between 1980 and 1984. A. CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE, supra note 201, at 186.
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difficulties as those pertaining to gray wolves. These regulations are sub-
ject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.20 3 Cur-
rently, questions concerning their validity under the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 remain unresolved.
II. Administrative Discretion to Authorize Regulated Taking
The Service has adopted the position that the Act affords the Secre-
tary unfettered discretion to determine when regulated taking is neces-
sary and advisable to conserve threatened species.20 4 Courts considering
the question justifiably have rejected this position. This section examines
how the Sierra Club v. Clark and Fund For Animals courts have analyzed
the scope of the Secretary's discretion as a question of law, and criticizes
the courts construction of the Act and its legislative history. It then ana-
lyzes the scope of the Secretary's discretion as a question of normative
judgment, arguing that reviewing courts should examine particular
agency decisions to ensure that they are based only on considerations
Congress would have sanctioned.
A. The Scope of Discretion Analyzed as a Question of Law
(1) Statutory Circumscription of Regulatory Discretion
To understand why the courts have rejected the Secretary's argu-
ment for unlimited discretion, it is necessary to recall the process of judi-
cial review of administrative decision-making. A finding of manifest
congressional intent is a threshold matter in judicial review of an admin-
istrative agency's informal rulemaking. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, the United States Supreme Court reversed a
lower court ruling that overturned the Environmental Protection
Agency's interpretation of the meaning of statutory language pertaining
to "stationary sources" of pollution under the Clean Air Act.205 The
Court held that the appropriate standard for judicial review of an
agency's statutory construction depends upon the particularity with
which Congress has addressed the matter in issue:
If the intent of Congress is clear.., the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute .... Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.20
6
203. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982).
204. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
205. 467 U.S. 837, 841-42, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
206. Id. at 842-43.
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Moreover, where Congress has not unambiguously declared its intent, a
court may not substitute its own views for an agency's interpretation of a
statute, as long as that interpretation is not "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.
'20 7
In Sierra Club v. Clark, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit correctly determined that the Act unambiguously circum-
scribes the Secretary's discretion to authorize takings of threatened spe-
cies.20 8 Circuit Judge Ross, dissenting in Sierra Club v. Clark, argued
that Congress had not unambiguously expressed its intent to circum-
scribe the Secretary's discretion to authorize takings. He argued that the
plain language of section 3(2) of the Act did not describe an exhaustive
list of conservation measures available to the Secretary, and that there
may be circumstances other than "population pressures" that would jus-
tify regulated taking. 20 9 He also maintained that Congress did not intend
to foreclose the Secretary's use of any method that achieves a conserva-
tion purpose. As a result, Judge Ross argued, the question of the permis-
sibility of regulated takings should depend solely on whether such
takings further a conservation purpose.
2 10
It is clear, however, that Congress intended to circumscribe the Sec-
retary's authority to permit the taking of threatened species. The
Supreme Court has noted that when the Act was adopted, Congress iden-
tified direct taking by hunters and trappers as one of two major causes of
species extinction.21 1 The Act's legislative history is rife with discussion
of the propriety of regulated taking of listed species.
The House and Senate versions of the bill differed with respect to
the permissibility of regulated taking of threatened species. This dispar-
ity was one of the key issues requiring resolution by the conference com-
mittee. The report accompanying the House version of the bill explained
that the scientific-propagation exception delineated in section 10(a)(1)(A)
"might even, in extraordinary circumstances, include the power to cull
excess members of a species where the carrying capacity of its environment
is in danger of being overwhelmed." 21 2 The House Report, in discussing
the Secretary's responsibilities under section 4(d) to promulgate regula-
tions for the protection of listed species, also stated that "[o]nce an
animal is on the threatened list, the Secretary has an almost infinite
number of options available to him with regard to the permitted activities
for those species. He may, for example, permit taking, but not importa-
207. Id. at 844.
208. 755 F.2d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1985).
209. Id. at 621 (Ross, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 621-22 (Ross, J., dissenting).
211. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978) (quoting S. REP. No. 307,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973)). The other cause identified was loss of habitat.
212. H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 94, at 156 (emphasis added).
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tion of such species .... 213
The definition of "conservation" in the Senate version of the bill was
amended to read "'[c]onservation' and 'management' . . . [include,]
when and where appropriate,. . . the protection, propagation, conserva-
tion and restoration of such species, including regulation and taking nec-
essary to these ends."' 214 Senator Frank Moss, who proposed the
amendment, explained, "What we are trying to do here ... is to define
conservation and management in a way that is agreeable to and sup-
ported by the wildlife community. It reinforces Congress' determination
... that our invaluable and irreplaceable wildlife resources be handled on
a professional and not simply an emotional basis.
'215
The permissibility of taking threatened species was debated exten-
sively by Congress before it passed the Act. Michigan Representative
John Dingell stated:
H.R. 37 has been attacked by some as an anti-hunter bill; it has been
attacked by others as a prohunter bill. In reality, it is neither-it is a
bill which has been carefully drafted to encourage State and foreign
governments to develop healthy stocks of animals occurring naturally
within their borders. If these animals are considered valuable as tro-
phy animals, and are not endangered, they should be regarded as a
potential source of revenue to the managing agency and they should be
encouraged to develop to the maximum extent compatible with the
ecosystem upon which they depend.216
Minnesota Representative Bob Bergland recounted for the House
his state's proposal for managing the gray wolf, including a provision for
"some harvesting if the wolf was doing damage to the deer herd or to
livestock or to farms in [the] general region." He foreshadowed the con-
troversy that was to ensue over the matter when he stated, "I would
certainly hope that the Secretary would accept that [management] plan,
once authorized by the Minnesota Legislature." 2
17
Ultimately, however, the conference committee declined to grant
the Secretary broad discretion to permit regulated takings. The commit-
tee omitted language permitting regulated taking "when and where ap-
propriate" from the final version of the bill passed by both houses.
Instead, section 3(2) of the Act limited regulated taking to the "ex-
traordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem
213. Id. at 12, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 94, at 151 (emphasis
added).
214. 119 CONG. REC. 25,681 (1973) (Senate consideration and passage of S. 1983, with
amendments, July 24, 1973) (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 25,682.
216. 119 CONG. REc. 30,163 (1973) (House consideration and passage of H.R. 37, with
amendments, Sept. 18, 1973).
217. 119 CONG. REc. 42,912 (1973) (House agreement to the conference report, Dec. 20,
1973).
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cannot be otherwise relieved .... ,,218 The Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference emphatically rejected the more permis-
sive grants of taking authority contemplated in the House and Senate
bills:
The Senate bill contained language defining the term "conservation
and management" as these concepts relate to endangered species: the
House bill did not. [T]he term was redefined .... In extreme circum-
stances, as where a given species exceeds the carrying capacity of its
particular ecosystem and where this pressure can be relieved in no
other feasible way, this "conservation" might include authority for
carefully controlled taking of surplus members of the species. To state
that this possibility exists, however, in no way is intended to suggest
that this extreme situation is likely to occur -it is just to say that the
authority exists in the unlikely event that it ever becomes needed.
219
Congress's intent to circumscribe the Secretary's discretion to au-
thorize takings is also unambiguously indicated by the ordinary meaning
of the plain language of section 3(2) of the Act. It is true, as contended
by the dissent in Sierra Club v. Clark,220 that the language in section 3(2)
describing permissible conservation measures connotes a nonexhaustive
list.221 "Regulated taking," however, is expressly included in this list
and, moreover, it is expressly qualified with a "population pressure"
prerequisite.22
2
Logical analysis of the statutory language reveals the flaw in the
dissent's argument. The list of authorized conservation measures is of
the logical form "you may do A, B, and (if x, then C)," where A, B, and C
are measures and x is a condition. Since the list is nonexhaustive, it may
logically include other unexpressed elements. If the list is interpreted to
include regulated taking when the population pressure prerequisite has
not been satisfied, however, it is transformed into a list of the logical form
"you may do A, B, (if x, then C), and (if not x, then C)." The open-
ended texture of the list is thereby used to reduce the population pressure
prerequisite from being a sufficient and necessary condition for regulated
taking to being simply a sufficient condition, rendering Congress's ex-
press inclusion of this condition in the list superfluous. Such an interpre-
tation ignores the ordinary meaning of the language which limits the use
of regulated taking to the "extraordinary" case of otherwise unrelievable
population pressures. Accordingly, there is ample justification for the
Sierra Club court's holding that the statute "on its face" and by its "plain
218. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, § 3(2), 87 Stat. 884, 885 (1973)
(now codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982)).
219. H.R. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3002 (emphasis added).
220. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
221. The permissible conservation measures under section 3(2) "include, but are not lim-
ited to" those listed in the statute. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
222. Id.
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language" limits the Secretary's discretion.22 3
(2) The Validity of Lethal Depredator Control
The Fund For Animals and Sierra Club courts have correctly held
that Congress directly addressed the question of the propriety of regu-
lated taking of threatened species, and that the Act circumscribes in some
way the Secretary's discretion to authorize such takings.224 The courts'
interpretations of the particular circumstances under which regulated
taking is permissible, however, are not as clearly defensible. There is a
strong foundation in the Act and its history for a more restrictive inter-
pretation of the scope of the Secretary's discretion.
Both the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,
in Fund For Animals, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in Sierra Club v. Clark held that the Act permits taking
of threatened depredators, but the courts disagreed on the source of that
authority under the Act. In Sierra Club, the court held that such takings
fall within section 10(a)(1)(A), 225 which authorizes the Secretary to issue
a permit allowing taking "for scientific purposes or to enhance the propa-
gation or survival of the affected species .... -"226 In Fund For Animals,
the court held that such takings fall within the Secretary's discretion to
issue conservation regulations under section 4(d),227 because, under sec-
tion 3(2),228 the definition of "conservation" includes regulated taking in
the extraordinary case where population pressures within an ecosystem
cannot otherwise be relieved.
229
It is unlikely, though, that the Endangered Species Act under either
section 3(2), as held in Fund For Animals, or section 10(a)(1)(A), as held
in Sierra Club v. Clark provides authority for taking of threatened
predators that commit depredation. Both houses of Congress debated
the depredation problem extensively before the Act was passed. 230 The
debate itself does not dispose of the question of Congress's ultimate in-
tent regarding the taking of threatened depredators, but it does demon-
strate that Congress was aware of the problem when the Act was passed.
Notably, while at least one other wildlife conservation statute ex-
pressly provides for taking depredators, the Endangered Species Act does
223. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1985).
224. See supra notes 204-23 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
226. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (1982).
227. Id, § 1533(d) (1982).
228. Id. § 1532(3) (1982).
229. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text; see also 119 CONG. REC. 25,680
(1973) (Senate consideration and passage of S. 1983, with amendments, July 24, 1973) (discus-
sion of problems presented by alligator populations in Louisiana), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 94, at 388.
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not. In 1940, Congress enacted the Bald Eagle Protection Act because it
feared that the bald eagle was threatened with extinction. 23 I With cer-
tain exceptions, the Act criminalizes taking or possessing any bald ea-
gle.2 32 Congress extended this protection to golden eagles by amendment
in 1962,233 to prevent inadvertent takings of immature bald eagles, which
resemble golden eagles. 2 34 At the same time, Congress expressly author-
ized the Secretary to permit taking of golden eagles "for the purpose of
seasonally protecting domesticated flocks and herds ... for such periods
as the Secretary determines to be necessary to protect such interests.
23 5
By comparison, the absence of such an express provision from the En-
dangered Species Act supports the conclusion that Congress did not in-
tend to authorize taking of threatened depredators.
It is also noteworthy that the Endangered Species Act specifically
exempts from criminal sanction takings committed in self-defense, 236 but
does not exempt takings committed in defense of property. This dispar-
ity also supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to authorize
taking of threatened depredators.
Finally, statements in the House Report accompanying the 1982
amendments to the Act also militate against the conclusion that Con-
gress intended to authorize the taking of threatened depredators. In
1982, Congress amended the Act to provide for the establishment of ex-
perimental populations of threatened or endangered species.2 37 The
House Report accompanying the amendments stated:
This new provision is intended to give greater flexibility to the Secre-
tary in the treatment of populations of endangered or threatened spe-
cies that are introduced into areas outside their current range. The
Committee believes that such introductions, if carefully planned and
controlled, may be beneficial in securing the restoration of listed spe-
cies. To encourage efforts to establish such populations when the con-
servation needs of a species would be served by doing so, this
amendment relaxes certain restrictions otherwise applicable to listed spe-
cies and authorizes the Secretary to relax others .... These regula-
tions can even allow the taking of threatened animals . . . . The
Committee ... expects that, where appropriate, the regulations could
231. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1982).
232. M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 89-90.
233. Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. 668 (1982)).
234. M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 90.
235. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1982).
236. The Act provides: "[I]t shall be a defense to prosecution ... if the defendant commit-
ted the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a
member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered
or threatened species." Endangered Species Act of 1973, § I 1(b)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(3)
(1982).
237. Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1423 (1982) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. 15390) (1982)).
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allow for the directed taking of experimental populations. For exam-
ple, the release of experimental populations of predators, such as red
wolves, could allow for the taking of these animals if depredations oc-
cur or if the release of these populations will continue to be frustrated
by public opposition.
238
The Report reveals that Congress authorized the taking of members
of experimental populations so that the Service could secure the coopera-
tion of private land owners and local governments, who otherwise might
not cooperate with the introduction of depredatory species. 239 It is ap-
parent from the Report, however, that these provisions relax protections
that otherwise apply to threatened species. Thus, liberalized permission
to take members of experimental populations stands in contrast to the
restrictions that apply to threatened species outside such populations, a
conclusion also reached by the court in Sierra Club v. Clark
240
(3) The Meaning of the "Population Pressure" Exception
Both the Fund For Animals court and the Sierra Club v. Clark court
determined that regulated taking is permissible under section 3(2) of the
Act when the Service makes a finding that population pressure exists
within a given ecosystem, and taking is the only alternative that will re-
lieve that pressure. 241 Neither court had occasion to interpret the scope
of discretion conferred under this exception because the Service did not
propound the population pressure argument in either case. This un-
resolved question is important, however, because the Service has relied
expressly on population pressure findings to justify unchallenged regula-
tions permitting hunting of grizzly bears,242 and has implicitly justified
regulated taking of gray wolves on a similar basis. 243 Moreover, the
Fund For Animals court in dicta tacitly endorsed the Service's
interpretation.
244
The Service's arguments for depredator control of wolves and bears
are basically the same as its arguments for public hunting of wolves and
bears. The Service contends that perceived economic and personal
threats posed by predators in the peripheral range cause vilification of the
species, which in turn causes illegal killings that are deleterious to the
species. Thus, according to the Service, unlawful human conduct renders
the species' status within the peripheral range one of "population pres-
sure" within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Act. The population
238. H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2833-34 (emphasis added).
239. See M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 351.
240. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 129-30, 133, 173, 179 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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levels determined by the expert recovery teams to be "optimum" are not
based on the biological characteristics of the peripheral range, but rather
on the behavioral characteristics of its human inhabitants. 245 In Fund
For Animals, the court agreed that where wolf populations exceeded the
recovery team's recommendations, depredators could be classified as "ex-
cess," and taken under section 3(2) of the Act.
246
The Service has admitted that population reductions to these "opti-
mum" levels may involve reductions below "biological potential. ' 247 In-
deed, one commentator has noted that "[the Service,] in choosing to keep
wolves completely away from cows, premised its decision on local polit-
ical reaction, not on legal or biological factors . . . . [A]lthough in-
structed to render a nonpolitical, biological opinion, the Recovery Team
premised its recommendations on accommodating local hostility .... -248
This interpretation of the population pressure exception is almost
certainly inconsistent with the intent of Congress. Although the statute
does not define "population pressure," the Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference, recognized by the Sierra Club v. Clark
court as the most dependable source of information regarding congres-
sional intent,249 described population pressure as the situation "where a
given species exceeds the carrying capacity of its particular ecosys-
tem."' 250 "Carrying capacity" is a term of art in wildlife biology used to
describe the biological capacity of an ecosystem to support wildlife.
251
While it is arguable that direct taking by humans constitutes a biological
factor affecting wildlife, it is unlikely that such "pressure" was intended
by Congress to be a determinant of the number of threatened individuals
to receive protection under the Act.
A much less strained interpretation of the taking exceptions under
section 3(2) and section 10(a)(1)(A) would limit their application to the
biological exigencies of wildlife management. Incidents like the Kaibab
Plateau debacle252 are examples of a common management problem
known as "irruption," whereby the number of a given species' population
increases to a high peak, outstrips the carrying capacity of the ecosystem,
and then plummets cataclysmically. 25 3 In such instances, regulated tak-
245. See supra notes 129, 152 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 133-34 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
248. Coggins & Evans, Predators' Rights, supra note 24, at 865 & n.447 (footnote and
citation omitted).
249. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
251. "Carrying capacity" is the maximum number of animals of a given species that can be
supported by a given habitat, and is a function of such factors as food and water supply,
climate, topography, cover, and extra-species interactions. R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 55-
57.
252. See supra note 25-26 and accompanying text.
253. See R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 143-46.
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ing of excess individuals may operate to reduce the "population pres-
sure" and prevent the crash. It is likely that this is the type of situation
in which Congress intended to authorize wildlife managers to intervene
when "population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be other-
wise relieved."
254
Similarly, wildlife managers might need to take and study individual
members of a threatened population for research and development of the
scientific understanding necessary to prudently manage and conserve the
rest of the population. Likewise, managers might wish to capture individ-
uals for captive breeding programs. Finally, as Judge Ross described in
his dissent in Sierra Club v. Clark,2 55 occasions might arise when a dis-
eased individual could jeopardize the survival of the remaining popula-
tion, unless managers had the authority to remove that individual. These
problems are undoubtedly the exigencies Congress intended to address
by providing a taking exception "for scientific purposes or to enhance the
propagation or survival of the affected species."' 256 It is unlikely that
Congress contemplated the use of the scientific-propagation exception to
minimize unlawful takings by reducing vilification.
B. The Scope of Discretion Analyzed as a Question of Normative Judgment
(1) Deference to Expert Administrative Agencies
The statutory constructions presented by the Fund For Animals
court, the Sierra Club v. Clark court, and several other commentators, as
well as this Note's alternative interpretation, all possess a common prob-
lem. Under the standard of review articulated by the Supreme Court in
Chevron, a reviewing court may substitute its statutory construction for
that of an administrative agency only when there are unambiguous mani-
festations of congressional intent regarding the particular questions in
issue.2 57 While it is absolutely clear that Congress did not intend the
Secretary to have unlimited discretion to permit takings, it is not abso-
lutely clear that Congress has "directly addressed the precise ques-
tion"2 58 of whether the circumstances in issue in Fund For Animals v.
Andrus, Sierra Club v. Clark, or the unchallenged grizzly bear regula-
tions fall within the population pressure or scientific-propagation
exceptions.
The Fund For Animals court concluded that section 3(2) prohibits
prophylactic depredator control, as a matter of law, but allows remedial
trapping that is conducted within one quarter mile of the affected prop-
254. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
255. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 621 (8th Cir. 1985).
256. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 10(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A)(1982).
257. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
258. Id.
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erty boundary.2 59 The Sierra Club v. Clark court held that section
10(a)(1)(A) prohibits sport hunting but allows depredator control.
2 60
Commentators have also agreed with the underlying proposition that the
population pressure prerequisite for authorizing regulated takings is a
rigid legislative standard by which a court may judge the decisions of
wildlife managers.2 6 1 Even this Note has framed the argument that sec-
tion 3(2) and section 10(a)(1)(A) prohibit government depredator control
and public taking of economically "excess" animals as a conclusion of
law drawn from the Act's language and legislative history.
2 62
The statutory language and legislative history, however, may pro-
vide an insufficient basis for concluding that Congress has unambigu-
ously expressed its intent with respect to these precise questions. The
arguments advanced to support each of these positions are largely infer-
ential. Notably, Judge Ross, dissenting in Sierra Club v. Clark, strongly
disagreed with the majority's construction of the Act, and averred that a
completely contrary construction was "compelled by the plain language
and legislative history of the Act. 12 6 3 If nothing else, this conflicting
interpretation is evidence that the congressional purpose may not be suf-
ficiently manifest in the Act's language and its legislative history to jus-
tify substituting any interpretation for the agency's own.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would uphold under the Chev-
ron standard a decision purporting to determine whether, as a matter of
law, the Act does or does not authorize lethal depredator control or regu-
lated public taking of threatened species. Where Congress has delegated
quasi-legislative rulemaking power to an administrative agency to regu-
late matters peculiarly within that agency's technical expertise, special
problems of judicial review obtain. The Court has declared:
[T]he principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been
consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the mean-
ing or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies,
and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge re-
specting the matters subjected to agency regulations .... If this choice
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that
were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not dis-
turb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.2 64
259. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
261. Goldman-Carter, supra note 142, at 96; Halleland, Sierra Club v. Clark: The Govern-
ment Cries Wolf 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 969, 991 (1985).
262. See supra notes 224-56 and accompanying text.
263. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 620 (8th Cir. 1985) (Ross, J., dissenting).
264. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (quoting
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)), rehg denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
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The Court is understandably reluctant to involve itself in the resolution
of bona fide conflicts between congressional policies; judicial involvement
in quasi-legislative functions, committed under our constitutional scheme
of government to the political branches, would contravene the separation
of powers. 265 The Court is also concerned, however, that agency deci-
sions involving technical determinations of scientific fact may be beyond
the courts' competency. As regulatory agencies have become increas-
ingly entangled in scientifically complex questions, courts have struggled
to define the appropriate contours of judicial review.
266
The debate that took place in the D.C. Circuit during the 1970s
exemplifies this struggle. Judge Leventhal, who is credited with articu-
lating what has come to be known as the "hard look" doctrine of judicial
review of administrative decision-making, 267 declared in Greater Boston
Television Corporation v. Federal Communication Commission:
A court does not depart from its proper function when it undertakes a
study of the record, hopefully perceptive, even as to the evidence on
technical and specialized matters, for this enables the court to pene-
trate to the underlying decision of the agency, to satisfy itself that the
agency has exercised a reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not
deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent.268
Chief Judge Bazelon presented the opposing view in his concurring opin-
ion in Ethyl Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency:
[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to
guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is
not for the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each
decision. Rather, it is to establish a decision-making process that as-
sures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the
scientific community and the public.... The process [of] making a de
novo evaluation of the scientific evidence invites judges of opposing
views to make plausible-sounding, but simplistic, judgments of the rel-
ative weight to be afforded various pieces of technical data ....
Because substantive review of mathematical and scientific evi-
dence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable, I con-
tinue to believe we will do more to improve administrative decision-
making by concentrating our efforts on strengthening administrative
procedures. 2
69
Notably, this debate properly implicates only questions of scientific
265. See id. at 864-66.
266. For a discussion of the evolution of administrative challenges since the New Deal, see
Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for Environ-
mental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983).
267. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 103 (1984).
268. 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
269. Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1977).
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fact. The technical complexity of questions of scientific fact is not the
only element complicating judicial review of agency decision-making:
[T]he difficult environmental cases that regularly confront agencies
and courts often turn on evidence of actual harm that is not immedi-
ately compelling-evidence based upon complex models whose valid-
ity cannot be tested directly; or upon statistical tests applied at the
limits of detectability, in the absence of knowledge about the biological
mechanisms by which harm may be caused. Given the tenuous nature
of the technical evidence and the uncertainties about how actual inju-
ries may occur, environmental controversies cannot be split into tech-
nical and legal parts.
2 7 0
Regulatory solutions to problems on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge usually involve uncertainty. An administrator who is di-
rected by Congress to issue regulations prohibiting activities that "endan-
ger" public health or welfare often must discharge that responsibility on
the basis of inconclusive scientific studies. The questions that arise con-
cerning the requisite level of confidence, or "standard of proof," to be
applied in reviewing such regulations 27 ' are questions of mixed law and
fact, or normative judgment. They involve a threshold question of law
that must be resolved by the courts: What is the requisite level of cer-
tainty to justify regulatory action under a given statute?27 2
(2) "Hard Look" Judicial Review
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, courts can and do have an
important role in reviewing technical agency decisions. Judge Leventhal,
in his concurring opinion in Ethyl Corporation v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, noted:
In the case of agency decision-making the courts have [a] responsibility
set by Congress. Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative
powers broadly-and courts have upheld such delegation-because
there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated
power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within
those limits by an administration that is not irrational or
discriminatory.
2 73
In proclaiming the standard for judicial review of regulations
promulgated by agencies under the informal rulemaking procedures of
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act,2 7 4 the Supreme Court
270. Yellin, supra note 266, at 1309-10 (citations omitted).
271. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 12-29 (judicial review of an agency's regulation of
lead in gasoline under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642); Reserve Mining Company
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (judicial review
of agency's regulation of taconite tailings in Lake Superior under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1160 (1970)); see generally Yellin, supra note 266, at 1313-15.
272. See infra notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
273. 541 F.2d at 68 (Leventhal, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
274. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
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has given tacit, albeit qualified, endorsement to Judge Leventhal's view.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the United States Supreme
Court reversed a lower court judgment rejecting a challenge to the Secre-
tary of Transportation's decision to build a highway through an urban
park.275 The Court declared that a court applying the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review pursuant to section 706(2)(a) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,2 76 must consider "whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment."
'277
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, the Court, considering whether the De-
partment of Transportation could rescind a previously adopted rule re-
quiring passive restraints in new cars, went further:
The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." In review-
ing that explanation, we must "consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment." Normally, an agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Con-
gress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an im-
portant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausi-
ble that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.
2 78
The Service has argued that taking regulations will serve a valid
conservation purpose by minimizing conflicts in the peripheral range be-
tween threatened wildlife and human economic interests,279 and that reg-
ulated takings of threatened gray wolves and grizzly bears will redound
to the overall benefit of the species.2 0 As Judge Ross noted in Sierra
Club v. Clark, this explanation could be viewed simply as a reasonable
exercise of the Service's expert discretion:
The clear purpose of the Endangered Species Act was to further con-
servation efforts. Congress did not intend to foreclose the use of meth-
ods which might achieve this purpose .... The majority's approach is
overbroad and thus detrimental to possible future beneficial uses of
regulated taking as a method of conservation.
281
275. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
276. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982); see also supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
277. 401 U.S. at 416.
278. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citations omitted).
279. See supra notes 108-11, 145-48, 189-92 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 110, 152-55, 192 and accompanying text.
281. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1985) (Ross, J., dissenting).
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Certainly, a strong public policy interest is furthered by having tech-
nically and scientifically complex decisions made by expert administra-
tive agencies rather than by inexpert courts. As the court recognized in
Fund For Animals, however, "the proposition that killing wolves is con-
sistent with conserving the species appears difficult to accept. ' 282 In de-
termining how best to conserve threatened species, the Service must
balance conflicting policies, assess scientific and nontechnical evidence,
and weigh alternatives, all pursuant to its own interpretation of the con-
servation mandate under the Act. Notwithstanding the Service's techni-
cal qualification to make scientific determinations, such regulations
involve threshold determinations that fall properly within the purview of
reviewing courts. While reviewing courts may not reject an agency's in-
terpretation of its statutory mandate unless that view conflicts with a
clearly expressed congressional purpose regarding the specific question in
issue, "hard look" judicial review is still necessary. "Hard look" review
ensures that the agency has adequately supported its findings of historical
fact, that its judgments of normative fact comport with the congressional
purposes underlying the Act, that it has not undertaken to "rebalance"
conflicting policies already assigned priorities by Congress, and that the
agency has not otherwise exceeded its scope of discretion under the Act.
In the next section, this Note proposes that the taking regulations re-
viewed in Fund For Animals and Sierra Club v. Clark, as well as those
pertaining to grizzly bears that have not been reviewed, are beyond the
scope of the Secretary's discretion to promulgate conservation regula-
tions under the Endangered Species Act, and thus would not survive
"hard look" judicial review.
III. Proposal
A. "Hard Look" Judicial Review of Taking Regulations
(1) Permissible Conservation Goals
The Service's interest in minimizing conflicts between wildlife and
human economic interests in the peripheral range runs as a thread
throughout its arguments in support of regulated taking. At times, as
when the Service argues that recovery of wolf populations should only be
encouraged in "appropriate habitat, ' 283 protection of human economic
interests seems to be the Service's primary concern. To the extent that
this goal is advanced as the ultimate purpose for regulations promulgated
under the Act's conservation mandate, those regulations run afoul of the
Act.
Subordination of wildlife interests to economic interests is paradig-
282. Fund For Animals v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189, 2199 (D. Minn.
1978).
283. See, e.g., supra note 161 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
THREATENING THE THREATENED
matic of the exploitation that has resulted in the decline and extinction of
many species.284 The Endangered Species Act, its legislative history, and
the judicial opinions interpreting it are replete with affirmations of Con-
gress's intent to reverse this trend regardless of the possibly dispropor-
tionate costs.
In 1978, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court
determined that completion of the Tellico Dam would result in the extir-
pation of the endangered snail darter, in violation of section seven of the
Act.2 85 Consequently, the Court enjoined completion of the dam despite
the consequent loss of $53 million.2 86 The Court declared:
[E]xamination of the language, history, and structure of the [Act] indi-
cates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be
afforded the highest of priorities .... The plain intent of Congress in
enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost .... [T]he plain language of the Act,
buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed
the value of endangered species as "incalculable. '287
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Hill, Congress has
retreated very little from this strong position. 288 The Act clearly does
not permit the Fish and Wildlife Service to promulgate conservation reg-
ulations that subordinate the interests of threatened species to local eco-
nomic interests. Such subordination does not constitute a reconciliation
of conflicting policies permitted under the Chevron standard, but rather
an administrative usurpation of the priorities established by Congress in
the Act and recognized by the Court in Hill.
The Service's argument that the taking regulations are not detrimen-
tal to the affected species 289 does not rectify the regulations' deficiencies.
The courts have held that the Secretary's mandate to conserve under sec-
tion 4(d) imposes a duty not merely to refrain from negative action but to
engage in affirmative action to increase the population of threatened spe-
cies.290 It is beyond the scope of the Service's discretion under the Act to
attempt less.
It is unlikely, though, that the Service considers protection of eco-
284. See generally supra notes 15-39 and accompanying text.
285. 437 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1978).
286. Id. at 166-67.
287. Id. at 174, 184, 187.
288. Congress amended the Act in 1978 to allow exemption from § 7's strict injunction for
certain projects. A formally designated committee will exempt a project from the require-
ments of the Act only when the project is of regional or national significance, there are no
reasonable and prudent alternatives available, and the benefits clearly outweigh those of all
alternatives that do not jeopardize listed species or critical habitats. § 7(g)(6), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(g)(6) (1982); see also M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 370-73.
289. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Fund For Animals v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189, 2199 (D.
Minn. 1978); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977).
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nomic interests to be the ultimate purpose for regulated taking. Rather,
the Service has argued that the ultimate purpose for these regulations is
to reduce the number of illegal takings of threatened species.
Since the Service has articulated a rational connection between ille-
gal taking and the decline of grizzly bears and gray wolves, the abate-
ment of illegal taking will be recognized by reviewing courts as a
conservation purpose that is cognizable under the Act. Using regulated
taking to achieve this purpose, however, raises additional questions.
While regulated taking might arguably redound to the overall benefit of
the species, it can do so only at a cost equal to the value of the lives of the
individuals taken. In addition to this direct detriment to the species, tak-
ing regulations and their associated "optimum" population levels entail
limiting the population of affected animals to below that of their biologi-
cal potential. This represents, at best, a strategic withdrawal from an
unqualified conservation effort.
The plain language and legislative history of the Act clearly indicate
that regulated taking is to be used only as a conservation measure of last
resort. Throughout the legislative history, congressional permission to
use regulated taking is restricted to "extraordinary circumstances, '291
"extreme situation[s]," and "unlikely event[s]. ' '292 Section 3(2) by its
language limits regulated taking to the extraordinary case where popula-
tion pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved.
293
Regulated taking necessarily involves some detriment to the affected
species. Where there are available alternative methods that are less detri-
mental to the species, authorization of regulated taking is an abuse of
discretion because Congress clearly determined that such taking should
be a measure of last resort. A reviewing court should not sustain regula-
tions permitting regulated taking where the Service has not articulated
sufficient reasons for rejecting alternatives that are less detrimental to the
species. In order to withstand review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, the explanations given must invoke considerations that are cog-
nizable under the Act, and eschew considerations that are not.
(2) Permissible Conservation Methods
The Service has determined that declining conditions in the primary
range cause dispersal of predators into the peripheral range, sometimes
resulting in depredation, which in turn causes vilification, and ultimately
results in illegal taking. Upon examination, it is clear that this causal
nexus admits of many possible points for intervention.
Assuming, arguendo, that improved enforcement of the laws prohib-
iting taking of threatened depredators is not an option available to the
291. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
THREATENING THE THREATENED
Service, 294 the Service can nevertheless have an ameliorative effect on the
problem by reducing the pressures on threatened predators that cause
them to disperse from their primary range. The importance of this effort
has been emphasized by the recovery team2 95 and by public comment on
proposed taking regulations.
296
The Service has indicated that the problem of declining conditions is
accorded high priority by the states. 297 Unfortunately, this response ne-
glects the federal responsibilities for the federal lands that constitute the
predominant portion of the primary ranges. The Service, in conjunction
with the Bureau of Land Management and National Park Service of the
Department of the Interior, and the Forest Service of the Department of
Agriculture, should give priority to the needs of threatened species in the
management plans for these federal lands.
The Act amply provides for this type of interagency cooperation:
section 7(a)(2) requires all federal agencies to insure that their actions are
not likely to jeopardize listed species,298 and sections 2(c)(1) and 7(a)(1)
direct all federal agencies to use their authorities in furtherance of the
conservation effort.299 While no court has yet reached the question
whether these sections create any obligations enforceable against federal
agencies, it is likely that the Act at least provides presumptive authority
for agencies to help implement conservation programs. 3°° Indeed, the
Supreme Court noted in Hill that Congress intended "to give endangered
species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal agencies."
'30
Where there is evidence that unexploited opportunities to improve
conditions in the primary ranges exist, reviewing courts should not up-
hold taking regulations unless the Service has made a sufficient showing
that enhanced habitat management efforts are impossible or will be inef-
fectual. A controversial example of such an unexploited opportunity has
been described by several commentators who have criticized the National
Park Service for closing garbage dumps in Yellowstone National Park.
30 2
These dumps, which supported thriving populations of grizzly bears
before 1971, were closed by the Park Service because the dumps were
deemed to be in conflict with the Park Service policy of maintaining only
"natural" habitats in National Parks.30 3
294. In drafting the Act, Congress assumed that state resources would be necessary to
ensure effective enforcement. The Service lacks resources to perform this function itself. See
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
297. Id.
298. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
299. Id. at §§ 1531(c)(1), 1536(a)(1).
300. M. BEAN, supra note 18, at 356-58.
301. 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978).
302. See A. CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE, supra note 201, at 142-94.
303. Id. at 149.
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Both the former and current heads of the grizzly bear recovery team
have agreed that the dump closures are a major cause of the dispersal
and decline of grizzly populations in the Yellowstone ecosystem.
3°4
Where artificial feeding is feasible, and there is reason to believe that it
would have an ameliorative affect on the grizzly bear depredation prob-
lem, such feeding represents an unutilized alternative to regulated taking.
To authorize regulated taking as a conservation measure under such cir-
cumstances would contravene the Act's requirement that threatened spe-
cies be taken only as a last resort.
A number of nonlethal management alternatives have been sug-
gested by biologists and experimented with by the Service, including taste
aversion, flashing lights, fences, and guarding dogs. 30 5 Biologists have
recognized the potential effectiveness of these techniques, 30 6 and the Ser-
vice has reported some success with these methods. 30 7 Nevertheless, the
Service has rejected these techniques as alternatives to regulated taking
because it deems them to be incomplete, inconclusive, or nonimmediate
solutions.
308
The Service's argument has two prongs-one concentrating on the
limited effectiveness of these alternatives, the other on their cost in rela-
tion to the benefit they provide. As regards the latter, a reviewing court
should not uphold taking regulations when the Service has rejected non-
lethal alternatives simply because they are not "practical" or "cost-effec-
tive." Section 3(2) allows regulated taking only when there are no
alternatives, not when there are no practical alternatives. 30 9 As the
Supreme Court indicated in Hill, Congress, in passing the Act, did not
qualify the conservation mandate by making it contingent upon cost-ef-
fectiveness. 310 Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress specifically
rejected limiting the conservation mandate to measures that were
"practicable." 311
Neither should a reviewing court uphold taking regulations when
the Service rejects nonlethal alternatives on the basis of uncertain effi-
cacy. The Endangered Species Act is a precautionary statute, designed
to allow federal agencies to act to prevent the extinction of species that
304. Id. at 149-51, 171.
305. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Gustavson, Garcia, Hankins & Rusiniak, Coyote Predation Control by A ver-
sive Conditioning, 184 SCIENCE 581-83 (1974).
307. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
310. 437 U.S. 153, 175, 185, 188 (1978). For a discussion of the Service's argument that
human economic interests should be taken into account, see supra note 287 and accompanying
text.
311. 437 U.S. at 176-86.
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are "in danger" of extinction, 312 and to require federal agencies to insure
that their actions are "not likely to jeopardize" the survival of listed spe-
cies. 313 Precautionary statutes differ from remedial statutes, which ad-
dress injuries that have already occurred. Because the Act is a
precautionary statute, it authorizes the Secretary to act on a much lower
threshold of certainty concerning the probability of harm and the
probability of the efficacy of the preventive measures.
In Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the Clean Air Act, which authorizes protective measures upon a determi-
nation that gasoline emissions will "endanger" the public health or wel-
fare, permitted the EPA to act upon a finding that the emissions
presented a significant risk of harm.314 The court stated:
When one is endangered, harm is threatened; no actual injury need
ever occur .... A statute allowing for regulation in the face of danger
is, necessarily, a precautionary statute. Regulatory action may be
taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed, the very existence of
such precautionary legislation would seem to demand that regulatory
action precede, and optimally, prevent, the perceived threat ...
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontier of scien-
tific knowledge... we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of
cause and effect .... The Administrator may apply his expertise to
draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely substantiated, re-
lationships between facts, from trends among facts, from theoretical
projections from imperfect data, from probative preliminary data not
yet certifiable as "fact", and the like.
315
Although Ethyl Corp. involved an agency decision to act in the face
of uncertainty, rather than a decision not to act because of uncertainty,
the doctrine of probabilistic justification under precautionary statutes
should be equally applicable when an agency has rejected nonlethal alter-
natives because they are of uncertain efficacy. Just as requiring certainty
would frustrate the purposes of a precautionary statute, allowing rejec-
tion of promising alternatives simply because they are unproven would
be similarly counterproductive. The Act clearly authorizes the Service to
use alternatives whose effectiveness has not been demonstrated with cer-
tainty. Accordingly, the experimental status of nonlethal alternatives
should not be a cognizable ground for rejecting them. In Fund For Ani-
mals, the court considered the merits of regulated taking and concluded
that "[o]ther experiments must be conducted. ' 31 6 Increasing the empha-
312. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), 1532(20) (1982); see also supra notes 69-71 and accompanying
text.
313. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2) (1982); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
314. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1977).
315. Id. at 13, 28 (original emphasis).
316. 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189, 2198 (D. Minn. 1978) (emphasis added).
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sis placed on use of experimental, nonlethal alternatives would have an
incidental benefit of increasing the likelihood of discovering more effec-
tive alternatives.
Ultimately, the inability of nonlethal techniques to completely halt
depredation is also an insufficient reason for rejecting these methods as
alternatives to regulated taking. The Act clearly elevates the interests of
threatened species over the economic interests of individuals. By so do-
ing, the Act not only furthers esthetic and ethical goals, but creates eco-
logical benefits that redound to the nation as a whole.
In Fund For Animals, the court indicated that the Service, when
striving to conserve threatened species, need only protect local economic
interests "where possible. ' 317 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that
some loss of livestock might be "unavoidable. ' 3 18 In actuality, the
amount of economic damage caused by the vestige of depredators that
resists nonlethal control efforts is relatively small.3 19 The Act provides
no authority for rejecting nonlethal depredator control techniques be-
cause they fail to prevent a small amount of depredation.
Finally, where there is a program in place to compensate property
owners who suffer depredation losses, a reviewing court should not up-
hold taking regulations aimed at further minimizing those losses. The
Service argued that reliance on state compensation programs to compen-
sate for the few instances of depredation that occurred despite other pre-
ventive efforts would be seen by some as acquiescence, causing
vilification and illegal takings. 320 The persistence of obdurate persons in
unlawful behavior after all reasonable efforts to provide them with lawful
alternatives have failed hardly justifies decriminalizing their unlawful
conduct. To allow regulated takings for this reason might entail sacrific-
ing a relatively large number of animals to avoid the illegal taking of a
few.
Some of the exigencies confronting the Fish and Wildlife Service
require solutions that are currently beyond the Service's material and
statutory capabilities. Solving these problems will require fortification of
the national scheme for conserving listed species.
The dispersal of species populations from their primary ranges into
peripheral ranges is an inevitable consequence of biological recovery, and
not always a symptom of habitat mismanagement. "All species tend to
press on the boundaries of their geographic ranges, sending colonists to
occupy new areas as the carrying capacities of their original habitats are
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. For example, only seventeen domestic animals were lost to gray wolves in Minnesota
between 1975 and 1978. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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exceeded." 32' Dispersal is not only inevitable, but desirable as well. Ex-
tinction is more likely to occur in the geographically small areas that
constitute even our largest parks and refuges, 322 especially for large
predator species like grizzly bears.
323
The existing authority under the Act to acquire new lands for wild-
life habitat 324 is of paramount importance to the wildlife reclamation ef-
fort, and the Department of Interior should use this alternative
aggressively. This goal would be further advanced by increased funding
for land acquisition at the state and federal level.
Encouraging the use of the existing authority to introduce experi-
mental populations of listed species outside their current range325 would
also be of great benefit to the reclamation effort. Establishing these popu-
lations would facilitate live translocation of unwanted animals from pe-
ripheral areas, obviating the need for other control techniques.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that local opposition may sometimes
frustrate these reintroductions. 326 Additional provisions for economic
incentives to communities hosting such reintroductions might help to en-
courage wider receptivity to these experiments.
A major consideration adduced by the Service in its argument for
regulated taking of gray wolves was the recalcitrance of Minnesota au-
thorities who threatened to refuse to assist in the enforcement of the wolf
management plan unless provision was made for public hunting.327 Sev-
eral commentators have suggested that this was the major motivation for
the wolf taking regulations. 328
The Act already provides for federal financial subsidies to states that
cooperate in conservation efforts. 329 This device functions as the "car-
rot" within the federal scheme. A provision for withholding federal Pitt-
man-Robertson conservation subsidies330 from states that refused to
cooperate in conservation efforts might be a useful addition to the Act;
state game agencies depend heavily on federal revenues. Such a provi-
sion would perform the missing function of the "stick" in the federal
scheme. Similar provisions are found in other federal environmental pro-
321. R. DASMANN, supra note 5, at 56.
322. Id. at 169-70.
323. Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 65; see also Stringham, Possible Impacts on Hunt-
ing on the Grizzly/Brown Bear, A Threatened Species, in BEARS-THEIR BIOLOGY AND MAN-
AGEMENT 337 (C. Martinka & K. McArthur ed. 1980).
324. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 88, 237-38 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., A. CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE, supra note 201, at 139-40
(discussion of Wyoming's opposition to reintroduction of gray wolves into the Yellowstone
ecosystem).
327. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
328. See generally Goldman-Carter, supra note 142; Halleland, supra note 261.
329. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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tection statutes, and play an important role in advancing national inter-
ests in our federalist system of government.
331
Government compensation programs for property owners sus-
taining depredation losses are widely employed in Europe as the primary
means of managing conflict between threatened predator species and
human economic interests. 332 The government committee formed by the
Interior Department and the Council on Environmental Quality to study
predator control in 1971 recommended such a federal compensation pro-
gram, but this suggestion has not been carried out.
333
As one commentator has noted:
In recognizing the potential value of species in danger, federal legisla-
tors implicitly acknowledged that all salvage measures have costs, and
that the costs are often distributed unequally. All taxpayers share the
burden of biological recovery teams for listed species, a particular re-
gion may suffer disproportionately if a dam is not built, and a few
farmers may be the only ones to lose cattle to wolves .... If the nation
is to have a healthy population of wolves, there will be economic loss;
the loss allocation could be handled more equitably in other ways.
3 34
A federal compensation program supported by a national tax would
more equitably distribute the economic burdens associated with predator
conservation. Furthermore, several researchers have found that
"[n]onconsumptive users of wildlife are a large and diverse group (more
than 93 million people). Collectively, this group favors the general idea
of new sources for nongame funding, [and they are most] inclined to sup-
port voluntary contributions and general taxes .. .335
This potential for new conservation funding alternatives is not lim-
ited to the federal level. Voters in the state of Missouri authorized a one-
eighth of one percent increase in the state's sales tax to be earmarked for
wildlife conservation. This tax generates approximately eighteen million
dollars per year, which is used primarily for habitat land acquisition.
336
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 comprises the broadest spec-
trum of conservation mechanisms in the history of federal wildlife con-
331. The Clean Air Act is one example of a federal environmental statute which does
provide for such penalties for noncompliance. State failure to comply may result in a federal
ban on the construction or modification of power plants and factories, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(A)(1)
(1982), withholding of federal sewage treatment subsidies, id. § 7616 (1982), or withholding of
federal highway subsidies, id. § 7506(a) (1982). See generally F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER
& A. TARLOCK, supra note 267, at 231, 240-41.
332. See Mysterud, Bear Management and Sheep Husbandry in Norway, with a Discussion
of Predatory Behavior Significant for Evaluation of Livestock Losses, in BEARS-THEIR BIOL-
OGY AND MANAGEMENT 233 (C. Martinka & K. McArthur ed. 1980); Roben, Status of the
Brown Bear in the Pyrenees, id. at 243.
333. Coggins & Evans, Predators' Rights, supra note 24, at 850-51.
334. Id. at 866.
335. Mangun & Shaw, Alternative Mechanisms for Funding Nongaine Wildlife Conserva-
tion, 44 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 407, 412 (1984).
336. Coggins & Ward, supra note 13, at 73.
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servation. Wider employment of the full range of the Act's provisions
can make a significant contribution to the wildlife reclamation effort.
Fortifying the Act by adding stronger economic incentives for state and
local cooperation can further advance this goal, and supplementing the
Act by implementing novel conservation funding mechanisms can pro-
vide further benefit.
Conclusion
In 1973, Congress recognized that America's wildlife is a national
treasure, the loss of which would be both tragic and irrevocable. With
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Congress declared a strong policy
favoring the recovery of threatened and endangered species over the eco-
nomic considerations that have traditionally guided wildlife policies.
At first blush, it is difficult to reconcile authorization of regulated
taking of threatened species, whether by public hunting or lethal
predator control, with the goal of restoring the vitality of predator popu-
lations that have been driven to the brink of extinction by economic ex-
ploitation, industrial development, and neglect. Nevertheless, the long-
standing role that regulated taking has played in conservation programs,
combined with the tendency to adopt conservation policies that favor
short-term economic interests, has prompted federal wildlife managers to
employ this technique to resolve conflicts between threatened predators
and local property interests.
The administrative agencies responsible for implementing the Act
are faced with thorny problems in managing predator species, and they
are hampered by a lack of legal and material resources. Nevertheless,
where nonlethal alternatives to regulated taking are available, the courts
must ensure that these alternatives are given serious consideration, and
that regulated taking is permitted only as a last resort. Courts should not
shrink from this task. The obligation of judging administrators' fidelity
to legislative policies belongs uniquely to the courts, and the courts can
make an essential contribution toward advancing the strong national in-
terest in restoring imperilled wildlife.
The "hard look" method of judicial review of expert administrative
decision-making provides an able mechanism for performing this func-
tion under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations affecting gray wolves and grizzly bears will not with-
stand scrutiny under this standard where the Service has rejected alterna-
tives to regulated taking for reasons that are not cognizable under the
Act.
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